EXPERIENCES IN ARAB AFFAIRS

IRAQ AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT

Syria
Lebanon
Jordan

Palestine

Kuwait

IRAQ AND LEBANON

The relations between Iraq and Lebanon have been educational, economic and political at the same time. Lebanon is a great centre of modern learning which provides a meeting place for Western and Arab cultures.

Over fifty years ego, in 1921, when the Kingdom of Iraq was established and King Faisal the First was enthroned, I was among six students chosen by the Iraqi Ministry of Education to study at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. We want by the sea route which took us via Basrah, Karachi, Bombay, Aden and Suez to Haifa. From there we took the train to Damascus and Beirut. The other members of the group were, Mohammed Deshti, Khalil Feddoo, Hasan Jwad, Muhyiddin Yusuf and Yusuf Zainal. The trip took us 39 days. Two years later the desert route was opened, and people began to cross the desert by automobile And bus, a journey which took some 24 hours. Today the trip by jet plane takes less than one hour.

In 1924 we suddenly and unexpectedly found that we had become Lebanese citizens. This happened when Turkey and the Allies signed the Lausanne Treaty, for it stated that all subjects of the old Ottoman territories would become citizens of the territory in which they were at the time of signing. This provision of the Treaty made us Lebanese citizens. We had to go through the process of re-establishing our Iraqi citizenship based on the fact that we were in Lebanon on an Iraqi government educational mission.

At the American University I majored in Education and minored in Natural Sciences. In addition to my academic education, I practised and lived inter-Arab unity. In the student society of 'Urwat al-Wuthqa, Arab students met together -- Iraqis, Syriens, Lebanese, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Sudanese -- and we all worked together for our national aims, namely, the liberation and union of the Arab nation. Besides, in the Brotherhood society, we learnt to practice tolerance in inter-religious relationships. Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druzes used to meet to learn to understand and respect each other. Beirut was a great centre for education in Arab nationalism And religious tolerance.

After the arrival of our group in Beirut the flow of students from Iraq increased, from year to year. Hundreds of students from Iraq, men and women, went to the American University of Beirut for their university education or for a year or two as a preparation for going to other universities-in the United States. Very soon Iraqi graduates of the A. U. B. began to occupy responsible positions in the various Ministries of the Iraqi government.

After my graduation in 1927 I returned to Iraq and started teaching at the Teacher Training College of Baghdad. In those days Iraq needed teachers for its educational development, and Beirut was an important center for recruiting teachers. Since I often spent my summer vacations in Lebanon, I was Asked by the Ministry of Education to take pert with the American University in the selection and recruitment of teachers for Iraq. The teachers were usually graduates of the A.U.B. and included Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanians and Palestinians.

When crossing the desert became easy due to better mean of transportation, Iraqis began to spend the summer months in Lebanon where they could escape the heat of Baghdad and enjoy the beautiful weather and scenery of the mountains of Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. Thus Iraqi-Lebanese educational and economic relations become well established over the years, and those of us who had been educated in Beirut felt quite at home in Lebanon. In 1929 I went to the United States for my post-graduate studies in Education. On my return in 1932 up until the end of l942, I occupied administrative posts in the Ministry of Education, progressing from Supervisor General to Director General of Education. One of my functions in Education was the recruitment of Lebanese teacher and the sending of Iraqi students to the American University of Beirut. The numbers continued to increase with the development of Iraq up till the Second World War. Beirut continues to be an important educational centre attracting students from all over the Middle East.

During World War II, I was transferred from the Ministry of Education to take up the post of Director General of Foreign Affairs. It was at this time that the Lebanese national leaders, side by side with the Syrian national leaders, began to struggle for the termination of the French Mandate and for the independence of Lebanon. In Beirut Iraq had an accomplished Consul General, Tahseen Qadri, of Syrian descent. He later became the Minister at the head of the Iraqi diplomatic mission to Syria and Lebanon. He was well known to the early Arab nationalist for he had been aide-de- camp to King Faisal I. He had the friendship of the Lebanese political leaders and he reported their views and problems faithfully. At the same time he had the cooperation and confidence of both General Edward Spears, the British representative, and Mr George Wadsworth, the American government's representative in Beirut. It was Iraqis role to plead for the termination of the French Mandate and for the recognition of Lebanon as an independent state.

When the Lebanese leaders, including Bishara al-Khuri, Riyadh as-Sulh, Camille Sham’un, Saleem Taqla, 'Abdul Hameed Karami, 'Adil 'Usayran and others, were arrested by the French I wrote a few strong article for the Iraqi press defending the cause of Lebanon. Being Director General of Foreign Affairs at the time I could not sign my own name to what I wrote and so I used a pen name. Fortunately the United Kingdom and the United States both stood by Lebanon and defence the cause of its independence. Iraq, then did its best to see to it that Lebanon and Syria were both invited to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco 1954.

At San Francisco the Iraqi delegation worked hand in hand with the four other Arab delegations, namely, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. I established Friendly relations with Lebanese delegates, Wadi’ Na'im, Josef Salem and ‘Abdullah al-Yafi. Dr Charles Malik, another member of the delegation was already an old friend and classmate of mine. We thus had fine team work in San Francisco.

I was on the Trusteeship Committee that drafted Article 78 of the United Nation Charter which put a legal end to the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon and assured them of achieving political independence. The Article stated that "The Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality."

Before the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, Lebanon had already taken part in the establishment of the League of the Arab States and from then on Iraq's cooperation with Lebanon on a new political dimension. The Iraqi delegation which I used to lead to the United Nations cooperated fully and harmoniously with the delegation of Lebanon. Our policies in the world body were very close although Iraq usually was more forward, sharp and direct in stating them.

In the autumn of 1946 the British government called for an Arab Conference in London. As Foreign Minister I led the Iraqi delegation to that Conference. It was there that I came to know Camille Sham’un for the first-time. He was the Lebanese Minister to Great Britain and he headed the Lebanese delegation to the Conference. I came to appreciate his fine qualities and his zeal in defending the Arab cause. Later on we worked together in the United Nations fighting against the partition of Palestine And the establishment of Israel. Camille Sham’un was brilliant speaker and a charming states man. Our friendship and cooperation continued when he became President of the Lebanese Republic.

Riyadh as-Sulh, a well-known Arab nationalist, who became the first Prime Minister of Lebanon, was a loyal friend to Iraq, and we could cooperate with him in all matters and situations arising in the Arab League. The Arab League was often divided about the way to handle the Palestine problem and about matters arising from differences in points or view where Iraq was on one side, and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other. Riyadh as-Sulh acted as an intermediary and harmonizer. Before going to the Arab League, we often had a preparatory meeting in Beirut which included representatives or Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Unfortunately my Syrian and Lebanese colleagues sometimes came to one decision in Beirut and then had to reverse it in the meeting in Cairo when they found Egypt or Saudi Arabia in determined opposition. Syria and Lebanon felt that the Arab League structure was not yet strong and homogeneous and that it was important to hold all the members together.

Riyadh's zeal and work for Syrio-Iraqi unity and inter-Arab harmony was genuine and memorable. I shall never forget his efforts in the last days of his life to bring me together with Nazim a1-Qudsi of Syria in Shtawra

(See Syria,129 ).

Side by side with Riyadh as-Sulh I should like to remember with appreciation the wise and respected Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Hameed Franjia, who played a constructive role in handling Lebanese relations with sister Arab states. Lebanon was deprived of a highly qualified man when he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and fell ill. In succeeding years at the United Nations I continued to cooperate with leaders of the Lebanese delegation –- Philip Taqla, Charles Helou, Fuad Ammun, and most of all, Dr Charles Malik. We usually consulted on all matters affecting our policies. We were united in defending the Arab cause, standing by the liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and following an anti-Communist line. This same policy was followed by Iraq and Lebanon in the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, where Dr Charles Malik was the embodiment of Lebanese policies and the Lebanese delegation was the closest one to the delegation of Iraq.

Lebanon, although a small Arab state, had a great advantage in international affairs because of its Christian-Muslim character and because it represented a meeting place for the occident and orient, culturally and politically. In 1952 the government of Pakistan proposed a summit meeting for the heads of Muslim states. Teheran was suggested as the place of meeting. I went to Karachi to discuss the matter with the Governor-General, my friend Ghulam Mohammed. From Karachi I flew straight to Beirut where I had a meeting with President Bishara al-Khouri, a Maronite Christian and a broadminded, wise statesman. I put before him the idea of the Islamic summit conference and suggested that Lebanon should certainly take part, for the presence of Lebanon would serve the cause of Christian-Islamic brotherhood and mutual understanding. Furthermore, the presence of Lebanon would ally any suspicious or misunderstanding in the West towards the Islamic conference. I emphasized the importance of Lebanon’s role as a connecting link and a symbol of brotherhood between Islam and Christianity. Sheikh Bishara listened very carefully and responded very generously. Unfortunately the summit conference was never realized -- not because of Lebanon, but mainly because Egypt and Turkey for the moment showed no interest in the project.

At the time of my Premiership, 1953-54, Beirut was the meeting place of Syrian Arab nationalists who had sought refuge there from the dictatorship of Shishakli. Since Shishakli's policy was anti-Iraq in those days, we contacted the Syrian leaders and helped them in their efforts to rid Syria of Shishakli. My friend, ex-Premier Saleh Jabr, was requested to go to Lebanon to achieve two purposes. The overt one was to study with the Lebanese government the possibility of diverting the oil pipeline which used to run from Kirkuk to Haifa to make it run from Mafraq in Jordan to a port in Lebanon. At the same time he was authorized to contact the Syrians and render them all the help they needed.

I myself made occasional trips to Beirut and contacted personalities there like Sheikh Ma’aruf Dawalibi, 'Adnan al-Atasi, Salahuddin al-Bitar and Michel 'Aflaq, and others. Besides, the Lebanese press, and especially Al-Hayat, owned by my friend Kamil Muruwa, volunteered to serve the cause of Syrio-Iraqi federation. President Sham’un was aware of Iraq's intentions and policies with which he was quite sympathetic. He often gave valuable advice.

One of the big obstacles to Syrio-Iraqi unity was the Lebanese Christian fear of Muslim domination. That fear had some historical roots from the Ottoman days and it was nurtured by old French colonial policies. France used to consider herself as the protector of the Christians of Lebanon. Christian-Muslim feelings have been largely harmonized in modern times and a sense of national unity and brotherhood prevails today in Syria and Lebanon and religious tolerance has become the order of the day, but there will always be some residue of the past in the subconscious.

Fortunately, on account of Iraq's record of amity and understanding of the Lebanese situation, the Christians of Lebanon harboured confidence in her good intentions towards Lebanon in the case of federation between Iraq and Syria. To emphasize this fact and to assure my Christian brethren in Lebanon that Iraq would always stand by them and appreciate their point of view, I had a lengthy session at the headquarters of Al-Kataib, the Maronite Christian Party and Organization, with the leaders of the movement headed by Sheikh Pierre al-Jumayyil. Accompanied by my friend, Muhsin Saleem, a well-known lawyer, I also had an excellent session with His Eminence the Maronite Patriarch Maoushi with whom I had a very friendly and frank talk about Muslim-Christian brotherhood and the need for checking the tide of materialism and moral disintegration in modern times. Patriarch Maoushi is a man of high standing in statesmanship and religious affairs. He is one of those who see the value of Lebanese-Arab unity and harmony. The important thing to the Christians of Lebanon is to preserve the unity and identity of Lebanon and to see to it that Lebanon is not swallowed by or amalgamated with its Arab neighbours. This wish I was ready to support.

     Lebanon is the home of another movement which was started by a Christian but which has adopted a laic philosophy and a concept of nationalism much more restricted than Arabism. It is the Syrian Nationalist Party founded by Antun Sa'ada in the 30's of this century. This party holds that the people of the Fertile Crescent, which includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, form one nation. The star or the Crescent will be Cyprus. This militant party had its own cult and rigid discipline .

    I had rather contradictory with the leaders of this party. Knowing my genuine desire for Syrio-Iraqi federation and my faith in unity, they approached me through the dynamic Iraqi military attach6, Colonel Salih Mehdi Samarra'i, who himself was devoted to the cause or Syrio-Iraq federation. They offered their help for the cause of unity and asked Iraq for material support. For my part I was appreciative or their zeal and readiness for sacrifice, but I continued to preach a broader Arab nationalism to them. I did, to some extent, accept cooperation with them on the understanding that any federation in the Fertile Crescent would be a station on the way to greater Arab unity. I had meetings with Georges 'Abdul Massih, one of their leaders who was later dropped by the Party. Asad al-Ashqar, Ghassan al-Jedid, Adeeb Qaddure and Sa’id Taqiyiddin. The latter a great Lebanese literary figure was my friend and classmate in U.A.B. I had great faith in his sincerity and devotion. He sacrificed all his possessions in serving the cause in which he believed.

    Realizing the important role which France could play in Lebanese politics, I accepted an invitation to tea from the French Ambassador to Lebanon, H.E. Mr Balayc whom I knew personally since he had previously been stationed in Baghdad. On this occasion I explained to him exactly my idea or the Syrio-Iraqi federation which I hoped would be realized through free democratic processes and would serve both countries. I assured the Ambassador that such a federation would in no way be harmful or inimical to any Arab state and this would be especially true for Lebanon whose independence and special character Iraq appreciated and respected. Moreover such a federation would surely promote Syrio-Iraqi friendship and cooperation with France. Mr Balayc showed complete understanding and expressed sympathy and approval of the effort.   My purpose was mainly to allay French and Lebanese Christian fears of such a federation.     My friend Kamil Muruwa, appreciating the role of France and the French language in Lebanese politics, often advised that Iraq should purchase a French language newspaper in Beirut. This idea, however, could not be swallowed by Iraqi politicians. Nuri as-Sa’id once told me, "Syrio-Iraqi federation requires the agreement of France." But he did not, at the time, put much faith in the use of mass media and propaganda machinery for achieving political ends.

    Beirut, besides being a center for cooking Syrio-Iraqi federation, also became a battle ground on which the cold war over the Baghdad Pact was waged by the press. Egypt and Saudi Arabia both had press and propaganda media in Lebanon. Iraq and its pro-Western friends defended the cause of the Baghdad Pact. Lebanese foreign policy had much in common with Iraqi foreign policy as far as relations with the West was concerned.

    President Camille Sham’un was kept fully informed on Iraq's moves in the Baghdad Pact affair and his counsel and point of view were well appreciated by Iraq. The pact in its early stages, was called the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between turkey and Iraq. After Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan had joined, it became known as the Baghdad Pact. When President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir called for a meeting of the Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo in order to unite them against Iraq's entry into the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, I was in Lebanon. I had a lengthy meeting with President Sham'un in which he advised that Iraq should be represented at the meeting in order to present and defend its point of view. He thought that, if Prime Minister Nuri did not wish to be present himself, he might nominate me to represent Iraq. That is what actually happened for I led the Iraqi delegation to the meeting of the Arab Prime Ministers.

    But while Lebanese foreign policy, as represented by the President, was on the side of Iraq, the Lebanese Prime Minister, the popular Sami as-Sulh, held views similar to those of Egypt and took Egypt's side although he tried to maintain a show of complete neutrality. When I suggested at the Prime Ministers' meeting that a delegation should be sent to Baghdad to talk over the question of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, Sami as-Sulh was nominated to head the delegation. While he was in Baghdad his Iraqi chauffeur report to Nuri as-Sa'id a conversation between Sami as-Sulh and Salah Salem. Sami stated that he was against Iraq's policy and in full accord with Egypt.

    When the tension between Iraq and Egypt began to increase, President Sham'un suggested to President Nasir that a meeting of heads of Arab stats should be held in Beirut to bring about understanding and harmony among the sister Arab states, but there were no positive results and the cold war continued between Iraq and Egypt.

    After Iraq’s entry into the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, later called the Baghdad Pact and Egypt’s negative stand, hops of having Lebanon join the Pact began to diminish. The same was true in the case of Jordan and Syria. The masses were aroused against the Pact by propaganda in the mass media. In spite of Lebanon's friendship and affinity with Iraq and Turkey, it was not practical for her to join. President Sham’un was a sincere friend of Iraq, so, when the cold war between Egypt and Iraq became intense, the anti-Iraq propaganda machinery in Beirut mobilized a section of the Lebanese community to be anti-Sham’un. In 1958 an attempt was being made to amend the Lebanese Constitution so that President Sham’un could be reelected. The anti Sham’unites, helped by Egypt and the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau, started politically inspired strikes which led to sanguine incidents inside Lebanon. Syrian elements, said to be directed by President 'Abdul Nasir's regime in Syria, began to infiltrate into Lebanon and add fuel to the fire. Lebanon considered this to be an interference in its internal affairs and took the case to the Council of the League of Arab States and then to the Security Council of the United Nations, accusing Egypt of interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon and jeopardizing its safety and security. Iraq sympathized wi:h President Sham-un. I was asked-by H.M. King Faisal II to defend the cause of Lebanon at the security council of which Iraq was a member at the time. Accordingly I went to New York and delivered a speech in defence of Lebanon. My speech contained a definition or Nasirism and explained that it meant the domination by President Nasir or the Arab world and the opening of doors for Communism to penetrate the Arab world. That speech cost me a sentence or 20 years imprisonment passed on me in December, 1958, by the Special High Military Tribunal or Iraq. A special Article had been inserted in the Criminal Law prepared by the Iraqi revolutionaries against the old regime. The article stipulated that who ever delivered a speech in an international body against the head or an Arab state should be sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. All such revolutionary laws were applied retroactively. I was the only person accused under that Article.

    While attending the Security Council in the spring of 1958, my efforts were not limited to work in the United Nations. I cooperated with Dr Charles Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, to think or ways and means by which peace and harmony could be restored to Lebanon. I thought at the time that Iraq could playa significant role to that effect, and that Lebanon should and could rely on Iraq for help in getting out or her predicament. I conveyed a message to President Sham'un through Dr Charles Malik suggesting that Lebanon might consider possible ways of associating herself with Iraq and or getting Iraqi support in restoring peace and resisting external infiltration and aggression. Lebanon might: join the Arab Union which federated Jordan and Iraq, or, enter a treaty relationship with Iraq like the one which I had signed on behalf or Iraq with Jordan in 1947, according to which either state could call on the other for help in case of internal mutiny or disorder, or, sign a military pact with Iraq.

    When informed by Lebanon about the various proposals, Nuri as-Sa'id, Prime Minister of the Ar9b Union, approved of them. At first President Shamoun thought that the second possibility might be considered, but, in the end, he did not act on any of the proposals because he questioned the reliability of the Iraqi army. I myself had no knowledge or information about the political and cross currents inside the Iraqi military establishment.

    In Washington, Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik and I had tea with Under Secretary of State Christian Herter. Mr Rockwell, a State Department official, was present also .During the course of the conversation we discussed ways and means of restoring peace to Lebanon and ways in which America could help. I made a proposal, namely, that America should provide Ir9q with twenty army transport planes to carry Iraqi troops via Turkey to the Mediterranean and land them in Beirut. The Iraqi military force would stand between the two sides in the fighting as a bulwark of peace and prevent a continuation of the fighting while law and order was restored. Mr Rockwell asked me in passing, "Are you sure of your army” No decision was reached at this meeting.

    Soon after that I returned to Iraq and conveyed Mr Rockwell's remark about the Iraqi army to Foreign Minister of the Arab Union Tawfiq as-Suwaidi who passed it on to the Prime Minister of the Arab Union, Nuri as-Sa'id. Tawfiq as-Suwaidi told me later that Nuri pasha called American Ambassador Gallman and furiously protested the imputation concerning the Iraqi army. A few days later, July 14, 19se, the downfall of the royal regime was effected by the Iraqi army. The situation in Lebanon became more complicated as a result, and America landed troops in the country. In Iraq many members of the royal regime, including myself, were arrested and put in prison to stand trial on various accusations.

    My cultural and ideological relations with Lebanon will always remain as long as I live. I love Lebanon and its mountains. I have walked on foot from village to village from north to south and I have climbed all the highest mountain peaks. Besides, I have often gone to Lebanon to take part in cultural activities, giving lectures on Iraq, Middle Eastern politics and Education. From time to time some of my writings have appeared in the Lebanese press, especially in AI-Hayat daily newspaper, and several of my books in Arabic have been published in Beirut. I continue to cherish the friendship of many Lebanese nationalists and intellectuals, just as I value highly the spirit of brotherhood and harmony between races and sects on which Lebanon is founded. I think that the Lebanese ideals of freedom and tolerance are much needed in the Arab world today.

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IRAQ AND JORDAN

Towards the end of the First World War, when Emir Faisal, the third son of King Husain of Hejaz, entered Syria at the head of. the Arab army and was enthroned as the King of Syria. Iraq nationalists called for Emir Abdullah the second son of King Husain, to become king of Iraq. Very soon, however. the French evicted King Faisal from Syria and a campaign started for him to become King of Iraq. Emir Abdullah always felt that he was the legitimate King of Iraq, and he never forgot that his brother replaced him on the throne which was to have been his. After losing the chance of becoming the King of Iraq, he became the Emir of the barren land of Transjordan lying east of the Jordan River, a country which was mainly tribal and not economically viable. Transjordan, like Iraq and Palestine, was put under British Mandate by the League of Nations.

Emir Abdullah's relations with Iraq. a country which was also poor at the time, rested mainly on family ties which made the younger brother, Faisal. act as generously as possible towards his elder brother. But Transjordan depended mainly on British subsidies for maintaining its army and administration. Transjordant’s importance to Iraq was partly due to the oil pipeline which ran from Kirkuk in Iraq and across Trans-Jordan before reaching the port of Haifa in Palestine. The much-spoken-of Baghdad-Haifa railway which was to have given Iraq access to the Mediterranean, would also have had to pass through Transjordan. The idea of the railway was not pursued after the desert route to Beirut was opened to motor transport. The use of the pipeline was stopped after the 1948 occupation of Haifa by Israel.

Emir 'Abdullah paid occasional visits to Iraq, and it was during one of those visits in the 30' s that I first went to pay my respects to His Royal Highness Emir ‘Abdullah an impressive Arab personality, well cultivated in Arab tradition and literature. He was more conservative than his younger brother Faisal. I also had the pleasure or meeting Emir 'Abdullah's eldest son, Emir Talal, who paid occasional visits to Baghdad. He was a very polite and subdued Arab nationalist.

In the 30's, After having achieved independence, Iraq had a succession or internal troubles -- the Assyrian problem, the death or King Faisal the First, tribal upheavals, the Bekr Sidqi coup d'etat, the killing of the Minister of Defence, Ja’afar al-Askeri, the killing of the Minister of Finance, Rustam Haidar, the death of young King Ghazi in a car accident in 1939. During these years there was not much give and take between Iraq and Transjordan, but the family ties among the members of the ruling house were always alive.

King Ghazi was succeeded by his son, King Faisal the Second, who was a baby at the time. His uncle, Prince 'Abdul Ilah son of King ‘Ali, the eldest son of King Husain of Hejaz, acted on his behalf as Regent. Prince 'Abdul Ilah was the brother of Queen 'Alia, who was the mother of King Faisal the Second. The prince was very considerate and respectful towards his uncle, Emir 'Abdullah, whom he considered as the head of the royal Hashemite family.

When Prince 'Abdul Ilah had to flee Iraq at the time of the clash between the Rasheed 'Ali Gailani government and the British in 1941, Prince 'Abdul Ilah and a small team of Iraqi statesmen sought refuge in Transjordan. They returned to Iraq at the head of the Transjordanian army and entered Baghdad as seviours. From then on, Iraq's ties with Transjordan became more vital. Emir 'Abdullah's visits to Baghdad and Prince 'Abdul Ilah's visits to Amman became more frequent during the Second World War. In 1945 the Arab League was formed with both Iraq and Transjordan among the founding members. The year 1946 saw the termination of the British Mandate over Transjordan and the declaration of its independence, at which time Emir 'Abdullah became King 'Abdullah and Transjordsn 'became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Immediately after independence King ‘Abdullah sought complete cooperation with Iraq in political, economic, military and cultural. fields. In Februery 1946 Prince 'Abdul Ilah led a delegation consisting of the Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, the Minister of Justice, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and the Minister of Defence, Isma'il Namuq, to a meeting in Shuna, Jordan. Topics discussed included ways and means for Iraqi- Jordanian cooperation in achieving the aims of the Arab national revolution and in fulfilling the objectives of the Pact of the League of Arab States. A joint declaration was issued regarding what was called the Shuna Conference. While returning from Jordan there was a car accident in which my friend, Saleh Jabr suffered severe injuries to his right arm. He was taken to England for treatment.

In 1946 the Syrian government complained to the Arab League Council about King 'Abdullah's interference in the affairs of Syria by propagating printed material inviting Syrians to unite with Jordan. I was instrumental in preventing the League Council from condemning King 'Abdullah for his activities. (See Syria, PP.) On the 14th of April, 1947, as Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of my friend Saleh Jabr, I signed a Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Preamble of the Treaty expressed the fraternal ties and national unity which exists between Iraq and Jordan and the desire of the two parties for complete mutual understanding and cooperation in fulfilling national objectives as expressed in Article 9 of the Covenant of the Arab League.

Article 4 provided agreement for common defence in the face of a third-party aggressor.

Article 6 provided for cooperation in dealing with internal troubles or conspiracy.

Article 7 provided for the unification of the military system and exchange of military mission.

Article 8 provided for one country to represent the other when one party did not have a diplomatic mission in a certain country.

Article 9 provided for setting up permanent committees representing the two parties to deal with matters enumerated in Article 2 of the Covenant of the Arab League and those included economic and financial matters, communication, culture, questions of nationality, passports, visas and extradition of criminals, social affairs and health.

A big debate took place in the Iraqi parliament and specific objections were raised concerning Article 6 which provided for cooperation in dealing with internal troubles, for that might mean that the Jordanian army. which was British led, could interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. In the end, the Treaty was ratified by the Iraqi parliament.

Although the Treaty was never fully implemented, its spirit prevailed and influenced events during the lifetime of King 'Abdullah. Jordan was not a member of the United Nations, but, acting in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty, Iraq presented Jordan's point of view in the United Nations in particular cases. I recall that one time, while debating with Aba Eban of Israel, I got up from the Iraqi chair where I had presented Iraq's point of view, and went to Jordan's choir to answer Eben after he had attacked the representative of Iraq.

In 1948 the first War of Palestine was going on, and the Egyptian army was beseiged in Falouga. I was then a minister plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi asked me to go to Cairo to talk over the situation with my friend, Naqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister. (See Egypt pp.) I was accompanied on this mission by General Isma’il Safwat Pasha. On the way we stopped at Amman and I had an audience with H. M. King 'Abdullah. He opened his heart to me and told me that, while he had been appointed by. the Arab League as Commander-in-Chief of all Arab armies in Palestine, he had no knowledge of what was going on along the Egyptian front. The Egyptians had not arranged for him to visit their front nor did they answer his inquiries about their needs and difficulties. He told me th3t Egypt had already confiscated a shipload of arms intended for the Jordanian army. He told me that his army, which was British led and subsidized, was not his own. It was a British army in Jordan, but those who criticized Jordan and its military achievements should rather pay for the army and make it an Arab army. Actually no other army saved as much of Palestinian territory as did the Jordanian army, although it has been established that Glubb Pasha, who commanded the Arab Legion, never occupied Palestinian territory which had been allotted to Israel according to the United Nations plan of partition.

In 1949 Husni az-Za'im carried out his coup in Damascus and dismissed President Shukri al-Quwatli. Iraq responed to overtures by az-Za'im and there was an exchange of delegations between Damascus and Baghdad. This worried three Arab countries, namely, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. King 'Abdullah of Jordan thought that Iraq's rapprochement with Syria might cause him to lose the opportunity of becoming King of Greater Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not wish to see a power made up of a federated Syria and Iraq.

One day Jordanian Prime minister Tawfiq Pash Abdul Huda was sent to Baghdad by H. M. King 'Abdullah to convey a very frank message to me as Foreign Minister of Iraq. He told me that His Majesty was enraged by the Iraqi activities concerning Syria and that he was even threatening to invade Iraq. I laughed and said that Iraq would certainly welcome His Majesty and the Jordanian army. I asked Tawfiq Pasha to pay my respects to His Majesty and tell him that Iraq was ready to keep hands off Syria and to let His Majesty take it over. If, however, that should not be possible, what would His Majesty command? Would it be better for the Arab nation that Iraq and Syria remain apart, or would it be better for Arab states should eventually join them? I, as Foreign Minister would be delighted to get some high national guidance from His Majesty.

Tewfiq-pasha returned to Jordan, and, after presenting my point of view to King 'Abdullah, the Pasha telephoned me from Amman to tell me, "His Majesty kisses your cheeks and says that he was full confidence in your policy towards Syria." In the United Nations I continued to work on behalf of Jordan. I defended the Arab character of Jerusalem and opposed the United Nations plan for internationalization. That was King 'Abdullah's policy. But, when I found that all the other Arab states were backing the internationalization or Jerusalem, and that Israel was the main opponent or the scheme, I could not continue opposing internationalization. I joined the ranks of the other Arab states and the overwhelming majority or the members of the UN who stood for internationalization. Again this enraged King 'Abdullah who made a special trip to Baghdad to quarrel with Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id over the stand I had taken on the question of Jerusalem.

The Trusteeship Council of the UN met in Geneva to draft a constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem. Iraq was a member of the Council at the time, and I was the representative of Iraq at that session. Jordan sent its Consul General in Paris, Hafiz 'Abdul Hadi to be an observer at the Council's meetings. Through him I received a message from His Majesty to the effect that the internationalization of Jerusalem meant its destruction as a holy city, and that the Arabs would never rise unless all Syria was united and federated with Iraq. I assured His Majesty through Hafiz 'Abdul Hadi that, in spite of our best efforts to draft a good constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem, such internationalization would never be implemented so long as Israel and Jordan both resisted it.(see Palestine, pp.)

At the United Nations I worked for Jordan to be admitted as a member. Jordan was one of several states whose admission to the UN was blocked at the time by the Soviet veto in the Security Council. In Florence at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization conference in 1950, I worked for the admission of Jordan as a member of that body. To my regret the Egyptian delegation, led by Dr Taha Husain, voted against the admission of Jordan, the reason being that relations between King Farouq and King 'Abdullah were strained during that period. I tried to convince Dr Taha Husain to change his mind and give a positive vote, but without success. Jordan was admitted to UNESCO, but Egypt and Israel were conspicuous by voting against it.

I had a few opportunities of visiting Amman and talking tête-â-tête with H. M. King ‘Abdullah. As head of the Hashemite family he had to tackle some family problems in which his views differed from those of Prince 'Abdul Ilah. King 'Abdullah had' a much more liberal outlook on family problems than did Prince 'Abdul Ilah, and His Majesty asked me to do my best to influence Prince 'Abdul Ilah to be more tolerant and merciful.

King ‘Abdullah was also determined to see that the Iraqi and Jordanian thrones were united. He confided to me that neither of his sons was qualified to carry the burden.

Twice I was honoured by receiving Jordanian decorations. The First Order of al Istiqlal (Independence), and the First Order of an-Nahdha (Renaissance) were bestowed on me. Actually I felt the complete unity of interest and policy of both Jordan and Iraq. I never thought of Jordan as another state, but felt that it was a part of a Greater Syria which was a part of a greater Arab homeland. At the beginning of July 1951, a meeting was held in the mountain village of Sarsang in the north of Iraq where there was a royal summer residence. Present were several Iraqi statesmen including myself as President of the Chamber of Deputies and Tawfiq as-Suwaidi as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prince 'Abdul Ilah presided at the meeting which discussed a draft agreement for the unity of the throne of Jordan and Iraq which had been prepared by King 'Abdullah in his own handwriting.

Article 1 of the document stated, "The two kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan shall be united (federated) in accordance with conditions agreed upon." A Council of the Union was to be formed which would meet annually and alternately in one capital or the other, and which would be presided over by the King of the country in which the Council met.

Article 10 stated, "The two united (federated) kingdoms shall have one foreign policy and shall be represented by the sister state in any foreign country in case of one of them does not have a representative in that foreign country.

Article 12 stated that “The ruling family in the two kingdoms is considered to have the same right in the two countries in such a way that, if the King dies without en heir, the heir to the throne shall be a suitable personality from the off spring of the Greet Saviour, Al-Husain Ibn 'Ali." (King Husain of Hejes, father of King 'Abdullah of Jordan and King Faisal I of Iraq)

The meeting approved the principle of union and asked Foreign Minister Tawfiq -suwaidi to go to Amman to negotiate the draft agreement with H. M. King 'Abdullah. The handwritten draft prepared by King 'Abdullah remained in the pocket of the Foreign Minister who, on returning to Baghdad, resigned his post over a disagreement with the cabinet concerning the appointment of his brother as President of the High Court of Appeal. While ministerial squabbles were taking place in Baghdad, King 'Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951.

Prince Abdul Ilah accompanied by Nuri as-Said and Saleh Jabr, took King 'Abdullah's handwritten document and went to Amman to attend the funeral and to present the document to the Jordanian government. Some young Iraqi nationalists also went to Jordan to help build up public opinion in favour of Iraqi-Jordanian unity. The Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda, prompted by the Saudi Arabians and the British in Jordan, especially Glubb Pasha and Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Ambassador to Jordan, worked together to install King 'Abdullah's eldest son. Talal, as King of Jordan.

The Iraqis returned disappointed, but wishing Jordan and its new King all the best. Cooperation between Iraq and Jordan continued as before, although, from that time on, Saudi machinations along with those of Egypt began to, influence Jordan's policy vis-a-vis Iraq. The attitude of the British officials in Jordan rather puzzled me, for I had more than once discussed the eventual federation of Iraq, Syria and Jordan with the Foreign Office in London and I had had no negative response. This shows that, either there was no unified policy between London and Amman, or that my friends in London had not been frank about their real intentions.

King Talal could not carry the burden of the kingdom for long. He had to retire and R.M. King Husain Ibn Talal ascended the throne of Jordan. King Husain is a brave Arab nationalist who is, at the same time, a political realist. His relations with the Royal House of Iraq was cordial and correct, but he tried to be friendly with conflicting Arab sides, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. He tried to keep a balance between Iraq where his heart would be inclined, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt where other forces were involved. Jordan's politicians were also divided. Some, like Sulaiman Tuqan and Hezza’a al-Majali were known to be inclined to Iraq, and others, like Tawfiq Pasha Abul Ruda and Waleed Salah, were on the Saudi and Egyptian side.

I became Prime Minister of Iraq in September of 1953. At that time there was a Jordanian delegation headed by Hikmet al-Misri negotiating 3 million dinar loan for Jordan and other financial and economic help. The negotiations were concluded, and, on the 1st of October the following communiqué was issued:

Negotiations between the Jordanian delegation and the representatives of the Iraqi government took place in Baghdad .from the 21st till the 30th of September with a genuine brotherly spirit. The Iraqi side .fully realized the situation in our sister state and the heavy burden it carries after the tragedy of Palestine -- a situation which requires every Arab state to take part in protecting Jordan from the dangers that threaten it. The negotiations led to a trade agreement between the two states, and the Iraqi government offered financial help amounting to 150 thousand dinars to the front villages. This amount will include the 80 thousand dinars which is Iraq's share of help designated by the League of the Arab states. The Iraqi government also decided to take measures to open branches in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for both the Iraqi Industrial and Agricultural Banks. In order to complete the studies the two parties agreed to leave the door open for further negotiations regarding the loan and other economic projects.

Soon after, Israeli forces invaded Jordan and attacked the village of Qibiya killing men, women and children. On hearing the news I immediately flew to Amman to attend the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League which was called to study the situation. I went to Qibiya where I saw the extent of the destruction. I was deeply touched by seeing the village school which had been bombarded and destroyed. I had a meeting with the Jordanian authorities and discussed measures to be taken to defend Jordan and to present the case of Qibiya and its innocent victims to the world. On behalf of the Iraqi government I announced the donation of 10,000 Iraqi

diners for rebuilding the Qibiya school and asked that it be named the Faisal-Husain school.

In January 1954 I went to Cairo to attend the Council of the Arab League and presented the Council with a project for Arab unity. (See Egypt pp. ) It seems that by presenting that project without previous consultation with Jordan I had unintentionally been negligent concerning our brotherly ties, and H. M. King Husain was displeased.

After returning to Baghdad it was reported to me that King Husain had been told that Jamali had dedicated 100,000 Iraqi dinars for a plot against His Majesty and that Iraqi troops were ready to move into and take over Jordan when the time came. I was stunned by that fabrication. I went to King Faisal II, informed him of the malicious story and told him that I thought I must go to Amman personally to talk over the matter with H. M. King Husain. On the 11th of February I took a small military plane to Amman from where I went Straight to the King’s palace. After embracing his Majesty I set down and discussed the false rumours. I told His Majesty, "There are no 100,000 dinars in the Iraqi budget for your assassination and there are no Iraqi forces on the border with Jordan." I told him I have always cherished loyalty to the Hashemite House and I make no distinction between the Hashemite House in Jordan and the Hashemite House in Iraq, for in my view it is one House. I believe in the unity of the Hashemite House and Your Majesty has a home in Baghdad just as you have a home in Amman. For my part I am always ready to receive your direct commands by telephone. Mischief-makers should not be given a chance to intervene between Iraq and Jordan, or between Your Majesty and myself."

King Husain was deeply impressed by my coming personally to see him to dispel the false rumours and to demonstrate the spirit of unity and loyalty which I cherished. He expressed his regret for the time that had, elapsed with no contact with Iraq. He had been expecting a word from H.M. King Faisal since a letter from him had indicated that he intended to visit Amman and Jordan. At one time King Husain had almost reached the border of Iraq and had wished to continue on to Baghdad, but he had held back on account of having had no word from Faisal.

His Majesty wished to know something about our aims concerning Arab federation. He was frank to tell me that my going to the Council of the Arab League with the project of Arab unity had aroused his suspicions. He did not know what our plans were, and he asked why we had not come to an understanding with him before going to the League of Arab States.

My answer was, "Any work towards unity is only a fulfillment of the message of your great grandfather, King Husain of Hejaz, and we all carry that message with equal zeal." I continued with a history of the concept of Arab unity and the stand of his grandfather on the unity of Syria and the negative attitude taken by the Arab League on the subject. I said, "Iraq has no specific plan to offer to a specific country, but Iraq has approached the Arab states with new thinking -- thinking which realizes the difficulty of implementing complete Arab unity now. At the same time it is not satisfied with what the Arab League is achieving for the Arabs. The history of the Arab League shows that it has been very slow in moving, for it moves at the pace of the weakest and slowest of its members. Besides, the League is being hampered by the political blocs among its members. Syria's attitude toward federation is being vitiated by Saudi gold and foreign influences. Saudi fears of federation have no justification. Our attitude towards the Saudis is brotherly and correct. We do not know what the Saudis are worried about." I touched on Nuri Pasha's project for Syria and Iraq and how it was turned down by Sa’adallah al-Jabiri who thought that the Arab League should provide all the measures for unifying the Arab states.

Then I spoke about the role of the Hashemite House in promoting the Arab cause and the need for cooperation between Amman and Baghdad. There was a mutual Faisal Husain responsibility for achieving the mission of the Hashemite House and its unity. I said, "There should be no barriers and no formalities between Baghdad and Amman. Mutual visits and consultations between the two capitals should continue informally in the manner set by H.M. King 'Abdullah. We must combat foreign intrigues between us. “The welfare of Jordan is the welfare of Iraq, but the welfare of some other countries may not be the welfare of Jordan." I touched on the readiness of the Iraqi government to offer any help she could to the Jordanian government.

Then I touched on the attacks which Colonel Shishakli was addressing to Iraq. I described his policy and intentions. His Majesty said that he wished we could be in constant communication so that Jordan would not remain silent vis-a-vis the Shishakli campaign.

We touched on Egypt and the questions or defence, neutrality and pacts. We agreed on the necessity for a continued exchange or visits and readiness for continued cooperation and consultation. I said that the Arab states are more bound together than the states of the Benelux. We live in a world or blocs and groupings. I emphasized our respect for the independence or Jordan and the throne of Jordan. The cooperation and unity which we sought did not mean the eradication or political entities as envisaged by the Syrian Constitution. Rather we would start with the integration or economic, military, educational and foreign policy while retaining our political entity.

I expressed my view on the role or the Hashemite family in cementing the unity or the people, something I thought a republican regime could not guarantee. This required, however, that the monarchical regimes should provide honest constitutional governments.

His Majesty sent greetings and deep thanks to King Faisal and his thanks and affection to Crown Prince 'Abdul Ilah and expressed the wish to visit Iraq before going to Egypt.

Having achieved the purpose or my visit I intended to return to Baghdad in the afternoon of the same day. His Majesty objected to my quick return and insisted that I should pass the night in Amman and spend the next day also in Jordan. He kindly offered his personal plane to take me to visit Petra where I had a most delightful experience. Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti, President of the Senate, accompanied me on the visit.

I returned to Amman and spent a second night there. His Majesty would not permit me to leave Jordan the next morning for he had arranged an official luncheon in my honour at the royal palace. It was only in the afternoon of that day that I could return to Baghdad with our relations with Jordan most cordial and clear.

Two weeks after my return H.M. King Husain arrived in Baghdad to visit King Faisal. He also visited Basrah which was having an industrial fair. On the 2nd of March I had an audience with him in the presence of H.M. King Faisal on the royal yacht, Queen 'Alia. We discussed the project of federation which I had presented to the Arab League. King Husain stated that the way in which the project had been presented to the Arab League had embarrassed Jordan for there had been no previous consultation with them. I answered that Iraq had not presented a concrete project but a general invitation for a federation which should be followed by consultations and preparations on the part of those who accepted the principle of federation. I said that Iraq was always ready to initiate discussion on the subject with Jordan however the Jordanian government was ready for such a move. King Husain expressed the existence of a desire on the part of the Jordanian government to enter such negotiations for a federation with Iraq. I mentioned that Iraq's invitation for a federation with Jordan could imply three basic principles:

1) The unity of the army. I expressed Iraq's wish to achieve unity on condition that there should be no foreign command at the head of the Jordanian army.

2) Integration of financial matters. In this respect Iraq would be ready to offer the financial help and economic cooperation required for the interest of the two countries.

3) Unity of foreign policy. I said that Iraq would be ready to represent Jordan in any country where Jordan had no representation, but the important thing was not representation but complete understanding on the objectives and lines of foreign policy. Iraq's foreign policy, for example, was inclined to the west. Iraq's relations with Syria were vital, for the Euphrates united the two states. Iraq's oil and commerce had to pass through Syria, and Iraq provided a big market for Syrian products. Jordan, like Syria, had to turn to Iraq for economic development. Saudi Arabia should be convinced that such cooperation, which should lead to a federation, would in no way be contrary to her interests. It was on matters like these that our foreign policy should be clear and unified.

After King Husain's return to Jordan Israel attacked Jordan again in the village of Nahaleen, another act of destruction and loss of Arab life. I was Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister of Iraq. We sent asking what we could do and I received the following message from the Jordanian Legation in Baghdad.

In response to your telegram of the 24th of March. Present H. E. Jamali with the thanks of the Jordanian government for what was contained in your telegram. Inform him the details of the incident at the Nahaleen village and ask His Excellency to order the sending of one military expert or more to discuss with the Jordanian military authorities the readiness of the Iraqi army and air force to help Jordan to fill the vacuum in the necessary means of defending the country. Inform us about results immediately.

I received a telegram dated the 30th of March to the same effect from our Legation in Amman. It stated that H. M. King Husain had called the Iraqi representative and the Military Attache and expressed to them his fear that the Israelis might undertake an attack greater than that at Nahaleen and on a large scale. His Majesty wished to know what military help Iraq could render. I immediately answered:

“Iraqia, Amman.

Iraq is ready to send all that is within its military capacity. An officer of the General staff is coming to you to study the situation and estimate the quantity and quality of help in accordance with our potentiality.

Foreign Affairs.

These telegrams coincided with an unusually severe flood that threatened to wipe out the city of Baghdad. The 29th of March was the worst night. On the 19th of April I resigned as Prime Minister for reasons that had nothing to do with Jordan or the flood. (See Syria pp.)

The next Iraqi Cabinet was formed by Arshad al-Omari and I accepted the post of Foreign Minister. We had an amount of 150,000 dinars in the budget which was intended to be spent for promoting the cause of Syrio-Iraqi federation. This amount was diverted to Jordan by the Prime Minister as a financial aid.

In 1955 apolitical tug-of-war took place in Jordan between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt-Saudi Arabia on the other. The rift between Iraq and Egypt over the Baghdad Pact and over cooperation with the West had its effect on Jordan's politics. This was shown during the meeting of the Prime Ministers in Cairo when President Nasir called on the Arab states to pass a resolution against Iraq's joining the Baghdad Pact. Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id did not attend that meeting and I was asked to represent Iraq on his behalf as Head of the Iraqi delegation. I joined the meeting on the 27th January 1955. (See Egypt and Baghdad)

At that meeting the Jordanian delegation consisting of Prime Minister Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda and Foreign Minister Waleed Salah, did not support the Iraqi stand. As a matter of feet, Waleed Salah openly took the Egyptian side. He joined the committee sent by the meeting to Baghdad. The committee, headed by Prime Minister Sami as-Sulh of Lebanon, included Faidhi al-Atasi, Foreign Minister of Syria and colonel Salah Salem, Minister of National Guidance of Egypt. Waleed Salah acted in unison with Colonel Salah Salem and supported his point of view.

The same Jordanian personalities had shown no cooperation with the Iraqi delegation at Bandung, but thanks to Hezza'a al-Majali, a member of the Jordanian delegation, there had been no conflict between the two delegations at that conference. Hezza’a al-Majali, a noble Arab character, believed in the unity of the destiny and interests of Iraq and Jordan. He was a devout Muslim who had no tolerance for Communist infiltration and domination. At Bandung I discovered him to be a sincere friend and companion. Hezza'a al-Majali later became Prime Minister of Jordan and his government tried to have Jordan join Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian propaganda and machinations, however, were strong enough in Jordan to prevent its joining the Baghdad pact, some time later al-Majali was killed by a bomb explosion in his office.

The incidents at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and those concerning the Baghdad Pact proved that Arab disunity, especially between Iraq and Egypt, had its effects on Jordan’s politics, for the Jordanians were sometimes the victims of the tug-of-war. Another Jordanian who demonstrated the will for cooperation and unity was Wasfi at-Tell. In 1958 I had a letter from Wasfi at-Tell, who was Jordanian Charge d’Affaires at Teheran at the time, commenting on the Algerian war and regretting the great losses of life which the Algerians were suffering. Wasfi, who had been trained as an officer, thought that the Algerians needed special training in guerilla warfare, an art of war which had special methods and techniques with which he was familiar. He suggested that Iraq and Jordan together should provide up to 1000 volunteers whom he would train and lead in Algeria. (See Algeria pp. 54)

Relationships between President Nasir and King Husain fluctuated. There were times of friendship and cooperation and times of propaganda war in which President Nasir himself and the Egyptian radio station, Sawt ul-Arab. Voice of the Arab, would direct abusive language to King Husain and the Hashemite family. At such times Jordan would be closer to Iraq, for Iraq was already getting its share of the abusive propaganda. It was in such an atmosphere that the Egyptian-Syrian unity took place in the form of Egyptian annexation and domination of Syria. When that happened, I rushed to the royal palace in Baghdad and said, "Unless Iraqi-Jordanian federation is announced at once, we are headed for trouble in the Arab world." King Faisal and Prince 'Abdul Ilah both shared my point of view and they called on Prime Minister 'Abdul Wahab Mirjan to send a delegation to Amman to discuss the federation of the two countries. ‘Abdul Wahab's Cabinet initiated the process in 1958 but had to resign. Nuri as-Sa'id formed his last Iraqi cabinet. I had the post of Foreign Minister. We negotiated the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan and revised the Iraqi Constitution to facilitate the implementation of the Arab Union.

Nuri as-Sa'id was not enthusiastic for that union. He did not wish to make Iraq carry the financial burdens of Jordan which was receiving financial aid from both Britain and America. I had a different outlook. To me Jordan was a part of my nation. It was an Arab state which should be supported by its sister Arab states. Its army was an Arab army which should be supported by Arab money. No needy Arab state should depend on foreign support while sister Arab states could come to its aid. To alleviate Nuri's worries about the financial burden I suggested that efforts should be exerted to invite Kuwait to join the Arab Union in which case Kuwait and Iraq together would shoulder the Jordanian financial burden.

From then on Nuri worked hard to have Kuwait join the Union, but Kuwait was still under British protection at the time, and Britain did not seem ready to make a move to grant Kuwait independence and have it join the Arab Union. I even suggested to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, who passed through Baghdad coming back from a SEATO meeting on his way to London, that the Sheikh of Kuwait should be recognized as the King of Kuwait and that an independent Kuwait might join the Arab Union. If that had happened and the money of Kuwait and Iraq had come to Jordan's support, Jordan would have become strong and fortified to face the Zionist danger. I always felt as much concern for Jordan as for Iraq. I never believed in the political frontiers. I believed that we were one people, one nation with one royal family and one destiny. When going from Baghdad to Jordan I rarely carried my passport with me.

When the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan was formed in March 1958, I was appointed as one of the five to seven members to be nominated by the King of Iraq to the Arab Union Council. From then on there were two Cabinets - the Iraqi Cabinet and t he Cabinet of the Union. King Faisal of Iraq was the head of the Arab Union and King Husain was Vice-President. Nuri as-Sa'id was the first Prime Minister 'of the Arab Union. In May 1958, King Faisal, the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id and the Arab Union Cabinet Ministers and Members of the Council all went to Amman for the opening session of the Arab Union Council. We attended an official dinner given by H.M. King Husain that night. The next morning I had to leave urgently for New York at the insistence of H.M. King Faisal. I had to go to the Security Council where Iraq was a member and defend Lebanon which had lodged a complaint against President Nasir's interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. This caused me to miss the opening session of the Arab union council. The Union between Iraq and Jordan ceased to exist after the downfall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in July 1958.

When I came out from prison in 1961 H. M. King Husain was gracious enough to delegate Wasfi at-Tell, Jordanian Ambassador to Iraq, to inquire about me and to convey His Majesty's good wishes. When I left Iraq in 1962 on account of poor health, the Jordanian government invited me to go to Amman to help establish the new University of Jordan. Unfortunately my health did not permit me to accept the kind invitation.

IRAQ AND PALESTINE

'Ibn il-Iraq’

No one problem has ever occupied time, energy and thought in my life equal to the Palestine problem. As a student, as a teacher, as a member or national and social organizations, I have always sympathized with my brethren, the Arabs of Palestine, in their suffering due to the grafting onto the Arab world of a foreign body which has so far been most poisoning to the health and vitality or the Arab nation. In 1944 I was appointed as Director General in the Ministry or Foreign Affairs or Iraq. In that post I had access to Zionist material coming to us from the United States. I could watch the increasing Zionist activity and machinations aimed at achieving the goal or creating a Jewish state in Palestine. I began to publish articles in the Iraqi daily press telling the public of the potential Zionist danger to the Arab world. I could not sign my name in my official capacity, so I chose a pen-name, 'Ibn il-Iraq', Son of Iraq. Immediately after the Second World War those articles were published in Arabic in a booklet in Cairo, Egypt, entitled, The Zionist Danger, by 'Ibn il-Iraq'.

Second World War

At the beginning of the Second World War there were only four more or less independent Arab states, namely, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The Arab states, notably Iraq, joined the Second World War on the side of the Allies, just as they had done under King Husain of Hejaz in the First World War, to achieve the liberation and independence of their Arab brethren everywhere, including those of Palestine. During the Second World War the Zionists expressed their determination to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The Biltmore Resolution passed in New York City in 1942 was the first open official declaration by the Zionists of their intention to establish a state in Palestine. The Zionists began to exert their political influence in American elections. They worked on the two major American parties in such a way that the parties began to compete with each other in pouring out promises for the Zionists. The bidding between the Republican Party, headed by Thomas Dewey, and the Democratic Party, headed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in support of Zionist ambitions is well known. When the Arabs saw the enthusiasm of American politicians to win Zionist favour, the Arab states, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia, made one protest after another, warning the American government of the international consequences.

In 1944, during the War, I became Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Arshad al-‘Omari, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was firm and forceful in his defence of Arab rights in Palestine. Hamdi al-Pachachi, the Prime Minister, and Saleh Jabr, The Minister of Finance, were both enthusiastic in support of the Palestine cause. The American Minister to Iraq, Mr Loy Henderson, faithfully transmitted to his own government the honest and frank views and sentiments of the Iraqi government.

Probably the most outstanding diplomatic acts in defence of Palestine during the War were personal letters written by King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince 'Abdul Ilah (in the name of the King of Iraq) to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States. The texts of the two letters were alike as far as I can recall. I was responsible for rendering the Iraqi letter into English. The letter reminded President Roosevelt of Arab friendship and referred to the Covenant of the Calipha Omar Ibn al-Khattab (Allah be pleased with him!) to the Arab army which undertook the conquest of Palestine in early Islamic history. That great Calipha commanded the conquering army to treat the Christians in a just and humanitarian manner. The letter further reminded the President that Palestine having passed through so many historical developments belongs to its legal inhabitants, the Arabs. President Roosevelt was asked to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter of which he was the co-author. President Roosevelt's answer, dated April 12, 1944, included the following statement:

"...In the view of the Government of the United States no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Franklin Roosevelt"

The answer certainly contained an injustice to the Arabs who formed the majority in Palestine. Still, it gave the Arab rights equal weight with the Zionist claims, a fact which was completely ignored by Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, who yielded to Zionist pressure in whatever concerned Palestine.

Arab Publicity for the Palestine Cause

Propaganda plays a very important role in modern times. Its role is not less than that of the army or the diplomatic service in the cold war and the struggle amongst nations. Since the Arabs are the rightful possessors or Palestine it was their duty to undertake a vast publicity campaign for the Palestine cause in order to enlighten world public opinion. The Arabs were slow in this matter and trailed dismally in making their case known to the Western world. I thought that one or the important things that should be done for the Arab cause in Palestine was to in form public opinion in the West and especially in the United States, where the Arab point or view on Palestine, although based on history, justice and human rights, was never widely known. The United States, while playing a major role in influencing the destiny or Palestine, was saturated with Zionist propaganda which was not equaled by a knowledge or the Arab side of the question.

In December 1944, as Director General of Foreign Affairs, I submitted the following memorandum to the Minister or Foreign Affairs, Arshad al-‘Omari:

Subject: Project or Publicity in the United States. His Excellency the Minister,

Having seen the great importance which Your Excellency gives to the question or Palestine, I am encouraged to present to Your Excellency some observations regarding the organization or public information based on my personal knowledge or the United States, its special conditions, and the power of Zionism there. I am hoping that you will please look into these suggestions, and, if they meet with your approval in full or in part, that they may be implemented as soon as Your Excellency gets to Egypt and is able to convince the representatives of other Arab states to cooperate. It will appear to Your Excellency that the question is not one of sending two or three persons to the United States. The situation demands a campaign on a large scale, the establishment of an adequate structure and the allotment of large sums for this purpose.

My observations can be summarized as follows:

1. To counteract Zionist propaganda in the United States we must inform and influence American public opinion. It is not enough to work with personalities in the American government and members of the Congress in Washington. We must reach men of politics, leaders of big business, men of the church, the universities, scientific institutions, societies, clubs and the press. We must struggle hard and fight Zionist propaganda in every corner of the United States.

2. America is a great continent and working in Washington alone is not enough. Organization should not be restricted to Washington. There must be central headquarters in Washington, but there must be at least four auxiliary centres outside Washington, namely, a Centre in New York City which will feed the eastern states as far as Canada, a Centre in the city of Chicago which will feed the mid-western states, a Centre in San Francisco that will feed the western states, and a Centre in Dallas, Texas, which will feed the southern states. This is the smallest number of Centres which might have some effect. Without them the efforts of the body in Washington alone will prove ineffective.

3. The main Centre in Washington must be manned by at least five qualified persons besides the secretarial personnel. As for the other Centres, they should each be staffed by at least three persons with secretarial help as required. The Centre may find it necessary to employ some American newspaper correspondents or specialists in publicity with regular salaries.

4. We propose that these Centres should be independent of the Arab Legations and Embassies in their work and administration and that they should be headed by a prominent personality with rank not less than that of a Minister.

5. Activities (given in detail)

6. Budget (given in detail)

7. We can imagine that the Centre in Washington would be equivalent to an Embassy and that each of the other Centres would be equivalent to a Consulate General. It is not too much for the Arab states to support these establishments if they intend to achieve serious, fruitful work. We support the point of view of Musa al-‘Alami of the necessity for an extensive structure, but we go farther than he does. As for the point of view of 'Abdur Rahman 'Azzam that only three persons should be sent, that looks like a drop compared with the Zionist sea in the United states.

8. The success of the whole project depends mainly on the ability of the persons, the harmony amongst them, the degree of their zeal for the Arab cause and their adaptability to the American mentality and environment. I was pleased to read in the local press that Sayid Musa al-'Alami had a meeting in Beirut with Dr Constantine Zuraiq to discuss this project with him, for Dr Zuraiq (I have already introduced him to Your Excellency) should be considered as an active supporter of this project. Besides him there are other young Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians who could be depended upon. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could delegate Sayid 'Ezzeddin Ash-Shawwa, a graduate of Cambridge University. He is one of the distinguished young men qualified for the purpose. In Iraq we could choose three or up to five persons if required. Egypt is rich in qualified journalists and publicists. Dr Philip Hitti will undoubtedly offer his valuable advice for this project of information if it is not possible to convince him to become an adviser.

9. After appointing the person to head the organization, a statute should be drafted which will include principles and instructions to be followed by the Centres and to detail duties and functions. Much freedom will be left for each Centre to adapt its activities to local needs.

10. Besides establishing these Centres of Information, we propose that responsible personalities from the Arab world should visit America every now and then .Political and scientific delegations should be organized to contact responsible personalities who carry political and moral weight and to arrange dialogues with them. That is what the Zionists are doing. Great Zionist personalities frequently travel between Palestine and London, and Palestine and America. Such activities have increased in these days. We have just heard that Weizmann will visit America shortly. As for Shertok, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Zionist organization, he is on the move constantly and the same holds true of several other well-known Zionist personalities.

These are a few points which may be useful to Your Excellency when looking into the question of publicity in the United States.

With my respects,

Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

Director General of Foreign Affairs

After hearing an Iraqi proposal, the Arab League resolved to establish Arab Offices for Palestine propaganda in both the United States and Greet Britain. Musa al 'Alami, a prominent Palestinian leader, was asked to organize these offices. But the Arab states, with the exception of Iraq and Syria, did not take part in financing them. As for Syria, she paid her share for the first year only. Iraq was then left alone to support the offices up till the time of the tragedy of Palestine, when the offices were closed. Unfortunately they were closed at a time when they were most badly needed.

As for the Zionists, we find that they did not leave any sensitive spot in the world untouched by their propaganda. The Arabs on the other hand, rarely cared for the affairs of propaganda in those days, and never paid enough attention to them. It may be interesting to note that, when the Arab Office in New York was started, the Zionists agitated against it, and the police authorities were instigated to go to inspect it. When this happened I invited the American Ambassador in Baghdad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protested against the act which I considered unfriendly and harmful to Arab-American good relations I said that, if such acts were repeated, the Iraqi government might consider taking similar measure in connection with American institutions located in Iraq.

Five years after the partition of Palestine, when I was Prime Minister of Iraq, 1953-54, Dr’Izzet Tannus, a devout and loyal Palestinian, visited Baghdad. He discussed with me the importance of enlightening American public opinion regarding Arab rights in Palestine. He suggested opening an information office in New York City. I concurred and stated that Iraq was reedy to offer ten thousand diners annually (a dinar equaled one pound sterling) for the purpose from its very tight budget. I suggested that he should also contact Saudi Arabia for support. I learnt later that Saudi Arabia offered to match Iraq's contribution. Thus Dr Tennus was enabled to start the office. He did a very good job of publicity and education for the Palestine cause. The office worked well until the Iraqi Royal regime was overthrown in 1958.

The San Francisco conference

President Truman's policy of partiality towards the Zionists began to show itself openly in the Conference in San Francisco where the United Nations Charter was laid down in 1945. The Arabs were represented by five delegations from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, although Syria and Lebanon were not yet fully independent. The Arab delegations exerted their efforts so that texts would be included in the United Nations Charter guaranteeing the independence of both Syria and Lebanon, guaranteeing the rights of non-independent Arab states to self determination and independence, and protecting Palestine from Zionist invasion. The Arab delegations achieved relative success in all their objectives except in that concerning Palestine.

A special Article, Article 78, was put in the United Notions Charter to ensure the independence of Syria and Lebanon although these countries were not mentioned by name. The Article stated that "The Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." Iraq fought hard, side by side with Egypt, the Soviet Union, China and the Philippines to put a text into the United Nations Charter in the chapter on Trusteeship which would guarantee the right to self-determination and independence to all countries under trusteeship or colonial rule. After a struggle with the colonial powers that lasted almost a month we succeeded in putting into the Charter texts which, no matter how weak they were, could be considered as a big initial victory for the people of Asia and Africa. Many of these people have already profited from the provisions of the Charter. And others will profit from them in the future.

I represented Iraq on the Committee of Trusteeship, Dr Mohammed 'Owadh Mohammed represented Egypt, Mr Andrei Gromyko represented the Soviet Union, General Carlos P. Romulo represented the Philippines, and Dr Wellington Koo represented China. We five fought hardest in order to insert in the United Nations Charter the right of self-determination and/or independence for all peoples who were being ruled under mandatory or colonial systems.

But an impasse was reached in the Trusteeship Committee when the Arab states asked for a text which might protect the Arabs of Palestine from immigration and guarantee their independence. The struggle in the Trusteeship Committee between the American delegation, behind whom the Zionist delegation was sitting, and the Arab delegations lasted more than a month. It concerned the drafting of Article 80 of the United Nation Charter. The Arab delegations wanted the Article to include a guarantee for the rights of the majority in any country under mandate, and for their right to self-determination The American delegation, headed by Commander Harold Stassen, stubbornly resisted and fought the Arab proposal, thus serving the Zionist aim. That is why Article 80 was left devoid of a guarantee of the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, and the path remained open for Truman to muck up Arab rights to Palestine and to involve the U.S.A. in support of the ugliest imperialistic operation enacted in modern history.

After the failure of the Arab delegations to guarantee Arab rights in Palestine, the Head of the Iraqi delegation, Arshad el-'Omari, Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, left San Francisco in protest. I was entrusted with the affairs of the Iraqi delegation, and I signed the United Nations Charter on behalf of the government of Iraq.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry

No sooner did the San Francisco Conference end, then President Truman began to ask that the provision of the British White Paper of 1939 be no longer enforced. That white paper limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to 15,000 a year for a period of five years, after which immigration would stop and Palestine would be independent. Truman asked for 100,000 Jewish immigration to admitted into Palestine immediately.

The Zionists had already started to defy the British government. The terrorist gangs of Irgun and Stern threatened British officials in Palestine and kidnapped chosen ones, killing some, and using others as hostages. The Jewish Agency began to use various means for illegal immigration into Palestine. King David hotel in Jerusalem was bombed. British ships were boycotted in New York harbour. When Truman insisted on the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, opposed the idea openly in the British Parliament. After negotiations between the two governments, it was agreed that an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry should be sent to Europe and the Arab lands to study the conditions and to submit a report on what it deemed appropriate with regard to Jewish immigration and the future of Palestine. The Committee included amongst its member some who were very enthusiastic for Zionism and who defended the cause like the British Labour Member of Parliament, Richard Crossman. The committee came to Cairo and began to listen to the Arab point of view in Mena House Hotel.

The Iraqi government delegated me to go to Cairo to submit to the Committee the Iraqi point of view on the Palestine question. I did my best to make the statement strong in argument and clear in thought regarding natural Arab rights to their land in Palestine. Zionist claims were refuted with forceful logic. I requested the Committee to apply one moral principle to Arabs and non-Arabs alike, using the dictum: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." Just as an Englishman, an American or a Frenchman will not accept the detachment of any part of his homeland for any cause whatsoever, but will defend it with his life, so will the Arabs of Palestine and the Arabs of other parts of the Arab world defend their homeland. In the name of the government of Iraq I invited the Committee to come to Iraq to listen to the views of a number of Iraqi political leaders including Iraqi Jews. The Committee accepted the invitation and came to Baghdad after finishing its sessions in Cairo and Jerusalem. In spite of the peaceful defence undertaken by the Arabs, the Committee Report came out, as we had expected, in agreement with the wishes of President Truman, for the Committee recommended the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

The Bludan Meeting of the League of Arab States

The Arab states were outraged by the contents of the Anglo-American Committee Report, so prejudicial to Arab rights. The Arab League held a meeting in Bludan, Syria, to study the situation. It was decided at that meeting that the Arab states should each send a note of protest to Great Britain and the United States of America. It was also decided that the Arab states should attend the London Conference called by the British government to discuss the Palestine problem.

The Iraqi delegation proposed that the Arab states should contribute two million dinars (pounds sterling) a year for the Palestine cause, one million to be spent on an information service, and another million for buying up Arab lands which might pass into the hands of the Zionists, and for organizing Palestine Arab affairs. This proposal was not accepted.

As for the famous Confidential Resolutions of Bludan, they were no more than ink on paper. They resembled a big drum which echoes after but which is entirely empty. When I stood in Bludan as a member of the Iraqi delegation to belittle the Resolutions and to criticize the weakness of the stand of the Arab states with regard to the Palestine problem, brother members of the Conference shouted at me and addressed me with harsh protests, a fact which made the Head of the Iraqi delegation, Hamdi Pachachi, ex-Prime Minister of Iraq, stand up and ask that my speech be deleted from the minutes. By so doing he calmed the temper of the brethren.

The Confidential Resolutions passed by The Council of the League of Arab States in its 4th Session, Extraordinary, in Bludan in June 1946.

After discussion the Council of the League recommends the following:

1. The condition in Palestine moves towards violent confrontation due to Zionist military organization and terrorist societies. The Zionists are acquiring the habit of using force to dictate their will. This may lead to the Arabs of Palestine taking measures to protect themselves by similar arrangements. This will lead to friction between the two forces in which case the stand of the Arab governments will become extremely critical for they will not be able to prevent the Arab peoples from volunteering by all means to support the Arabs of Palestine with money, arms and volunteers.

2. If the recommendations of the Anglo-American Political Committee of Inquiry are adopted and a start is made to implement them, conditions between these two governments and the Arab states will worsen to a great degree so that it will become incumbent on the Arab states to defend themselves by taking some necessary measures and among these measures the following:

a. Acting not to permit the two states or either one of them or their nationals any new economic or other concessions.

b. Not to support their special interests in any world body.

c. Moral boycott.

d. Looking into the abrogation of what concessions they may have in the Arab states.

e. Complaint to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

On reading these resolutions one can see the weakness and lack of seriousness with which the Arab states began handling the Palestine problem. On my return from Bludan to Baghdad, the Iraqi government asked me to prepare a memorandum of strong protest to be presented to both the British and American governments regarding their unfair stand on the problem of Palestine which had led to the inimical proposals made by the Anglo-American Committee and the illegal flood of immigration into Palestine, and charging the governments of Britain and the United States with responsibility for the terrible consequences of their policy which WAS partial to the Zionists. The British Ambassador, Sir John Stonehewer-Bird, refused to receive the memorandum, and requested very earnestly that we should convey the message to the British government orally and put nothing so harsh as that on paper.

Crisis in the Leadership of the Palestine Arabs

One of the basic factors which led to the Palestine tragedy was the problem of leadership and the lack of democratic organization on the part of the Palestinians. The Leadership of the people was attained by arousing popular sentiment. Personalities might rise to leadership by personal charm, family background and a does of nationalism. Once a leader was in the saddle, he was usually not removable or changeable by democratic procedure. Authoritarianism on the part of a leader might lead to dissensions and conflict of personalities, which might weaken the whole national body. This was true of most of the Arab world and the Palestinians were no exception.

In the '30's the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haji Ameen al-Husaini, rightfully achieved leadership or the Arabs of Palestine and won the respect and affection of the Arab messes. Before the Second World War he came to Iraq where he enjoyed great respect and prestige among the nationalists. He also exerted some influence among the army officers who led the Rasheed 'Aali al-Gailani movement or 1941. That movement was anti-British and it led to the flight to Amman or the Regent or Iraq and a number or Iraqi statesmen. When the movement was crushed by the Jordanian army led by Glubb Pasha, Rasheed 'Aali and his regime fled the country. So did the Grand Mufti, Haji Ameen al-Husaini and his followers. Both Rasheed 'Aali al-GailaniaHaji Ameen al-Husaini landed in Berlin and were honoured guests of the Axis during the War

In the absence of the Grand Mufti the Palestinias had no single leader to replace him and this in itself hurt the Palestinian Arab cause. The charisma, popularity and control of Haji Ameen left no room for another person. When Haji Ameen returned after the War he was not popular either in Iraq or with the victorious Allies. This perpetuated the crisis of leadership. In 1947 Prime Minister Saleh Jabr attended a meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Beirut which dealtwith the Palestine problem. He sent a telegram containing the following statement:

The Mufti since coming to Beirut has shown great activity with the intention of forming a Palestine Arab government which for the present would reside somewhere outside Palestine. It is understood that he wants to preside over this government which will be made up of his followers and supporters. The head of one of the Arab delegations in a sub-committee opened the subject. He asked the sub-committee which was made up of Riyadh (as-Sulh, Lebanon), Jamil (Merdam, Syria), Sameer (ar-Rifa'i, Jordan), Naqrashi (Pasha, Egypt), Sheikh Yusuf al-Yaseen (Saudi Arabia), and Sayid Mu'een al-Madhi for Palestine, to discuss the matter.

I mentioned that the time has not come yet for such an act and that it would lead to many difficulties, disagreements and problems on the part of the Palestinians on the one hand, and the Arab states and the Mufti on the other. I told them very frankly that Iraq, which is fully reedy to work for the Palestine cause and to help the Arabs of Palestine, could in no circumstances cooperate with the Mufti in view of its conviction that the Mufti had failed terribly in dealing with Palestine question and that he had taken it from bad to worse. In fact his person was the cause of the tragedy. On the other hand, forming a government of this kind by a resolution of the League of Arab States would provide an opportunity for the Zionists to ask for the same thing and this would be a strong weapon in the hands of their supporters in the United States. This would complicate our difficulties. Moreover, no benefit is to be reaped from a government that carries the name but resides outside Palestine, for it can do nothing in the present situation. The idea was abandoned...

Iraq's enthusiasm for the cause of Palestine was at its height from 1944 to the beginning of 1948. Iraq allotted from its budget, which was small at the time, hundreds of thousands of dinars for the Arab Offices of Information and for saving Palestinian Arab lands from passing into Zionist hands and making Arab peasants homeless. In this the Iraqi government depended on one of the most loyal and best educated and realistic sons of Palestine, Muse al-'Alami. He was entrusted with both the projects until the downfall of the Saleh Jabr Cabinet in January 1948. In the meantime Haji Ameen al-Husaini felt that his leadership was being defied and weakened by the work that Musa al-'Alami was doing outside the Mufti’s realm of influence. It was to overcome this situation that Haji Ameen came to see me in Cairo.

This is the last part of a telegram which I sent from Cairo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq on the 25th of March 1947.

The Mufti asked to meet me. I met him tonight at the (Iraqi) Legation and the discussion lasted more than two hours. He began by thanking Iraq for its stand on behalf of Palestine and he said that the things that Palestine needed most were unity inside and solidarity outside amongst the Arab states. He hopes that the atmosphere will be clarified between the Higher Arab Committee and Iraq. He says that it is not reasonable or possible that there should be any alienation between them while Iraq is motivated so vigourously for the cause of Palestine.

Then he spoke of his old friendship with H.E. the Prime Minister and how he believed in his broad mindedness as well as his sacrifices for national goals.

Then he spoke at length about his life in Iraq and declared his innocence concerning what had happened (the Rasheed ‘Aali al-Gailani movement). He said that he is writing some brief memoirs and that he will offer a copy for the information of H.R.H. the Regent and H.E. Sayid Nuri Sa’id, and it will appear from it that he was an agent only of goodness, and that he did not take part in the unfortunate movement. He brings as witness the report which George Antonius made about him to the British government. He is searching for all the means that will improve his relations with Iraq.

Then he discussed at length the project of the Arab Offices (of Information) and Musa al-‘Alami. He expressed the necessity for Musa’s joining the higher committee if only morally. He had proposed to Musa to become a member of the Higher Committee and undertake the Offices and the Development Project. He refused. Then he (the Mufti) had proposed to him that his work should be under his (the Mufti's) auspices in his capacity as President of the Higher Committee. He refused. When Musa decided to leave (the Arab Offices of Information) he (the Mufti) asked him to hand over the Offices to persons on whom he (the Mufti) could rely like Raja'i al-Husaini or Ahmad Shuqairi. He refused. He (the Mufti) had proposed to him that he should become Director of Political Affairs. He refused. He (the Mufti) blamed Musa for Iraqis stand concerning the Offices. I told him that Musa was not responsible for Iraq's stand, but that Iraq found in the person of Musa a capable, loyal and reliable character. They (the government of Iraq) have entrusted him with the affairs of the Offices and the Development Project and I explained to him that it would be better for the public good if he supported Musa without interfering in his affairs. He promised to exert his efforts to come to an understanding with Musa on the basis of respecting Muse's dignity and the dignity of the Arab Higher Committee, but he wants to come to an understanding with Iraq by any means possible. He is thinking of sending a delegation to Iraq.

I asked him about his relations with the British. He said that the atmosphere was beginning to clarify between them and that if the British had been wise they would have depended on him in Palestine and their burden would have been much lighter. He said that world-wide Jewish propaganda against him has been unequalled by any propaganda, and it was that propaganda which made the British see him not as he truly is.

After a long discussion he requested me to exert my efforts to do away with whatever alienation there might be between Iraq and the Arab Higher Committee which represents Palestine. He charged me with his respects and greetings for H.R.H. the Regent and H.E. Sayid Nuri Sa’id.

The London Conference on Palestine

The British government invited the Arab states to Round-Table Conference to discuss the Palestine problem. It also issued a separate invitation to the Zionists in order to be able to negotiate with them simultaneously The London Conference was held in two sessions; the first towards the end of 1946, and the second early in 1947. The British side was represented by Mr Ernest Bevin, Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, and Mr Creech-Jones, Minister for the Colonies. The Arab states were headed by Prince Faisal Al Sa'ud, for Saudi Arabia; Prince Saif-ul-Islam 'Abdullah, for Yemen; Faris al-Khouri, for Syria; ‘Abdur Razzaq Sanhouri Pasha and later Isma’il Haqqi Pasha, the Egyptian Ambassador to England, for Egypt; Sameer Pasha ar-Rifa'i, for Jordan; Camille Sham'un, for Lebanon; and Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, for Iraq. 'Abdur Rahman 'Azzam Pasha (Egypt) Attended as Secretary-General for the Arab League. The Arabs of Palestine were represented by Jamal al-Husaini, Sami Taha and others.

The Arab delegations worked together in presenting the Arab point of view. They defended the Arab character of Palestine with full strength and clarity. They also took part in proposing a solution, based on a democratic constitution for an independent Palestine, which would be ruled by the legitimate inhabitants of the land irrespective of their race or creed. After the Arabs had completed the text of their project, the British side notified us that the Zionists flatly rejected the Arab project for the solution of the Palestine problem. This was to be expected.

Mr Bevin, on his part, suggested a solution for Palestine, the Morrison Provincial Plan, analogous to the Swiss cantonal system, whereby Palestine would be divided into Arab cantons where the Arabs formed the majority, and Jewish cantons where the Jews formed the majority. The Arab delegations rejected this solution. It was also rejected by the Zionists, as we learned.

The following statements represent Iraqi reasoning at that Conference:

Extracts from Notes of the Third-Meeting Speech made by H.E. Dr Jamali.

I should like first of all to thank Mr Bevin for turning his cards face-upwards on the table. I think that is the best way to reach complete mutual understanding. I also wish to register here that we in Iraq received with great pleasure Mr Bevin's statement that friendship with the Arab world is much more important for Great Britain than armies stationed in the Middle East. We certainly think that the mutual friendship of our two peoples is vitally important to us both, but I am afraid that the Palestine problem may overtax that friendship.

I should like to state here that we in Iraq are deeply concerned with the problem of Palestine. For us, it is a matter of internal affairs, besides its national and international significance, for our peace and stability are directly affected by events in Palestine. We have about 120,000 Jews in Iraq. For centuries Jews have lived with the Muslims and Christians in complete peace and harmony in Iraq. There was nothing in the political atmosphere to disturb peace and harmony until Zionism came to Baghdad. Then the Jews in Iraq began to find themselves, through no fault of their own, greatly embarrassed by Zionism, and the government is doing its utmost to prevent any intolerance which might lead to trouble between members of the various faiths.

Before dealing with the Morrison Provincial Plan, I should like to raise a few points which, to my mind, have direct bearing on any feature settlement of Palestine.

1. The first is that the Arabs desire peace and security but peace and security have been disturbed by political Zionism. The Arabs have always expressed their grievances and raised their voice asking for their rights. What they ere after is to reach a final settlement of their just cause. They are in despair. They have lost faith in Commissions and official statements, for, so far, they have seen shelved any decision which has been cognizant of their rights, while those decisions which favour the intruders have been carried out. I earnestly plead, in the name of Peace and justice, that peace and justice be granted to the Arabs in Palestine.

2. A very important point which needs to be settled once and for all is that Palestine has no magic about it. It is a small piece of country which has its natural physical capacity. There is nothing mystic about its capacity, nothing supernatural about it. Like any other country, it is inhabited by a people. The fact that it contains the Holy Places for the three great religions does not add to its natural capacity, nor should it create political complications. The mystic urge which the Zionists claim for Palestine is a myth, and should be exploded In the first place, Zionism is not a religious movement but e temporal political idea. In the second place, if we were to accept the precedence of mystic attachment for other peoples' lands we might very wall start a new cause for conflict allover the world, for any aggressive nation could develop a mystic attachment to someone else's land. Thus, it seems to that the Palestine problem should be dealt with naturally and humanly, without any mythology.

3. It seems to me that the basis of all trouble in Palestine lies in the nature of political Zionism, for political Zionism is an aggressive movement. We know of no limits to its aims and ambitions. Its ideology, combining race, religion Bnd nationhood has much in common with Nazi ideology. The very idea of a Chosen People and a Promised Land is nothing very different from Nazi ideology. Chosen People? Maybe. Promised Land? What is it that is promised? Is it part of Palestine? All of Palestine? Palestine and Transjordan? Palestine, TransJordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq? These are questions to which various answers have been given, according to expediency. We know very wall that the Zionists are not such fools as to spend millions, hundreds of millions of pounds, for a small arid country. They have come with much wider ambitions, ambitions to dominate at least economically all the Arab world, nay, all the Middle East. The Arabs certainly cannot stand indifferent to such aggressive intentions.

In their tactics, the Zionists have proved to be much deadlier than the Nazis, for they use methods of infiltration and squeezing-out of people from land and commerce which the Nazis never knew how to apply. In their deadly methods, and their terrorism, they are as efficient, if not more efficient, than the Nazis. The situation which I would like to lay before the British Government is that the Arabs are facing a big danger. They are faced with an invasion, for the Zionists are doing nothing less than invading Palestine. This aggressive invasion, coupled with aggressive ideology and tactics must be exposed to all the world. We hope that the British Government, which has the Arabs' friend ship so much at heart, will sympathize with the Arabs and decide to put a final stop to this danger.

I should like to ask Mr Bevin how he would welcome 500,000 Nazis imported into England to build a Nazi national home? I am sure he would oppose it and fight against it. But something similar to that is happening to the Arabs in the Middle East, and the danger is still growing.

4. With regard to the interference of the United States in the question of Palestine, I have two remarks to make. First of all, I am sure that the great American people, whose sincere stand for democracy and justice I never doubt, have been exploited by influential propaganda. I am sure that, once they are shown the truth and justice of the Arab Cause on the one hand. and the peril to their friendly relations with the Arab world on the other, they will cease to champion Zionism. In the second place, if we accept the premise of American interference, we should have to grant the same right to other nations. That is why we feel that the settlement of the Palestine affair should be the concern of the Arabs and the British Government alone. As for the Zionists, they have no basic rights in Palestine. They were given a favour by Britain which they misinterpreted and misused.
One of the fundamental facts that should be recognized is that the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine are never on an equal footing. The Arabs are the legal owners of the country, while the Zionists are aggressors and invaders. It is not a question of right versus right, but of right versus wrong.

5. We have to separate, completely and finally, the World Jewish Problem from that of Palestine. The Jewish Problem should be dealt with in Europe, for Europe needs builders who can repair the destruction wrought by the Nazis. We cannot claim to have won the war if the roots of Naziism continue in Europe, and continue to preclude the people of the Jewish faith in Europe from enjoyment of full civil and religious right. The truth is that malicious Zionist designs have been applied to de-nationalize European Jewry and make them believe that they do not belong where they are and that they should go to Palestine. The Arabs cannot be responsible for such inhuman designs.

6. Are the democratic principles implied in the United Nations Charter, the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms to be applied to the people of Palestine? Or are the people of Palestine to be victimized by designs and problems for which they are not responsible? Why are the Arabs of Palestine, through no fault of their own, to be penalized by deprivation of self-government and self-determination, simply because ambitious dreamers intend to establish a foreign state on an Arab land?

7. On more than one occasion, the British government has solemnly declared that they do not meet the Jewish national home to be a Jewish state, and that the Balfour Declaration was not intended to prejudice the rights and privileges of the Arabs to their own land. I should like to know whether the British Government still maintains the same position. If so, we hope that they will put en immediate and final stop to Zionist aims and ambitions, end see to it that no plan which is proposed for Palestine will lead to a Jewish state.

8. I am sure that, if Mr Balfour were alive, he would regret his own Declaration. That greet philosopher seems to have been misled and to have been told that Palestine was a land with relatively no inhabitants, or at least inhabited only by primitive peoples with no ideals or aims of their own. Now that that experiment has been tried for a quarter of a century, it is only great and noble to recognize that such a policy was not right and that it cannot lead to right. It is high time to make big decisions and to correct or at least to stop the wrongs of the past. The world needs to be established on principles and not on expediency. We should recognize the right of peoples and nations to live their own life in their own homes, and to enjoy self-determination. It is time that this should be recognized for the Arabs of Palestine.

9. No matter what view we hold about the use and value of history, the Arabs cannot give up their historical and legal rights to Palestine. No promises, declarations or statements acknowledging these rights can be ignored or forgotten. The McMahon correspondence and other First World War pledges; Paragraph 4, Article 22, of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 73 of the United Nations Charter; the various statements of policy made by His Majesty's Government; the Churchill White Paper of 1922; the Passfield Paper of 1930; the White Paper of 1939, are all British pledges which we continue to regard H1s Majesty's Government in honour bound to fulfill insofar as Arab rights and complaints are recognized in these documents.

Bearing the above points in mind, the Iraqi government cannot but reject the Morrison Plan of Federation, or, as it is now called, the Provincial Plan. This Plan certainly contradicts the following points:

(1) The Plan will most probably lead to partition. The Arabs will never acquiesce to partition, for, to recall the story of the two women before King Solomon, they are the true mother of the child.

(2) Partition will mean a Jewish state, and the Arabs will never acquiesce in any plan that might lead to that. A Jewish state would not only be a misfit in the Middle East, but a danger to all concerned. It would certainly be more than anything that the British government has never intended to grant to the Jews.

(3) The Plan would reduce a big portion of the Arab population to the status of a minority in a Jewish state. That we strongly oppose.

(4) The Plan might lead to further immigration, end, by artificially overcrowding a Jewish province, the Zionists might use every means to overflow and exploit neighbouring Arab lends.

(5) The Plan has all the defects which were clearly demonstrated by the Woodhead Report. In the long run, it will not work.

(6) The Plan deprives the Arabs of the best part of their country and makes them unable to support themselves financially. In this connection, I should like to refer to a point raised by Mr Bevin in his statement yesterday, that he cannot see how the Palestine budget could be met without Jewish money. I wish to state that the greater part of the Palestine budget is spent on the maintenance of a police force for the sake of security disturbed by the presence and actions of Zionism.

(7) We strongly object to the Plan for supporting the Anglo-American Enquiry Commission's view that Palestine should be neither Arab nor Jewish. That is a violation of the most elementary principles.

(8) We also object seriously to the reference made in the Plan to money to be spent on the Arabs in Palestine, and to a loan to be made to the Arab states. This may be due to a lack of understanding of Arab nature and character. The Arabs will never agree to give up their rights to their own homeland in exchange for bribes or material gain, from whatever source. An Arab would rather die of hunger than have his honour and dignity violated. National honour and dignity make us flatly reject such proposals.

(9) Iraq will never acquiesce in the establishment of a Zionist bridgehead in Palestine. We feel that there cannot be peace in the Middle East until the poisonous fangs of political Zionism have been pulled out.

These, in brief, are the views of my country. I have presented them very frankly, and, I am afraid, bluntly, but I Can assure you, honestly and sincerely. I also have laid my cards face-upwards on the table. I hope that the views which I have expressed will be taken in a spirit of friendship and sympathy, because it is only thus that we can lay the foundations of a just solution of the Palestine problem. Since the British government could not find the possibility of an agreement between the Arabs and the Zionists on any particular solution, and, since Mr Truman, the President of the United States of America, was steadily increasing pressure on the British to open the gates of Palestine to Zionist immigration, the British government decided to relieve itself of the question of Palestine by referring it to the United Nations Organization for a decision on what was to be done.

The United Nations Special Session

In response to a request by the British government, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a Special Session in the spring of 1947 to look into the Palestine problem. I led the Iraqi delegation to the Special Session which met at Flushing Meadows and Lake Success. My efforts were directed to defending the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and independence, to proving that Palestine could not provide a solution of the Jewish problem which is universal in character, and to showing that any denial of the application of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the Arabs of Palestine would lead to bloodshed and racial and religious conflicts.

The Arab delegations to the Special Session met together regularly to coordinate their efforts. Besides we approached the Asiatic and African states like Iran, Turkey and India (before its division into India and Pakistan) to take a united stand to defend the inalienable rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

It was at Flushing Meadows and for the sake of Palestine that the Asian-African states first began to work together as group. I approached the leader of the Indian delegation, the Indian Ambassador to United States, Mr Assif 'Ali, to bring the Arab and other Asian and African delegations together to discuss cooperation in handling the Palestine problem. Mr Assif 'Ali invited heads of delegations to a luncheon at a restaurant near Flushing Meadows and it was there that the Asian-African cooperation movement was initiated.

The General Assembly in the Special Session decided to establish a United Nations Committee of Inquiry to study the question of Palestine in all its aspects and to submit its recommendations to the General Assembly. I emphasized that the membership of the 6ommittee should not include those who were already known to be biased in favour of Zionism. In fact the Committee did include some members who were very enthusiastic for the Zionist cause such as the delegates of Uruguay and Guatemala.

After the Special Session I gave a press conference to the United Press in Washington, May 22, 1947, which reported:

Jamali sharply scorned what he called the Zionists ideals of conquest, declaring they were a hang-over from the ill-advised Balfour Declaration which was based on the 19th century imperialist outlook, when the Western world imposed its thoughts and desires on the East forgetting that the East has a culture and has potentialities to grow, develop , rise and build anew civilization.

Fadhel Jamali emphasized that the Arab states would not be bound by any united nation committee of Inquiry decision which recommended partition of Palestine or the imposition of a Jewish state.

Fadhel Jamali expressed the opinion that all that was needed to settle the Palestine situation was to leave the people of Palestine alone and let them lead a democratic life without distinction as to race or religion.

This, he emphasized, was the only solution in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

The Committee of Inquiry came to Sofar, Lebanon, in the beginning of the summer of 1947 to listen to the Arab point of view. I was in London at the time but I flew to Lebanon to appear before the Committee and present the point of view of the Iraqi government on the Palestine problem. (See Appendix )

In August the Committee of Inquiry submitted its report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. The members of the Committee were not unanimous in their recomendations. The majority recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish, state and an internationalized Jerusalem (Corpus Separatum). The minority, which included members from Iran, India and Yugoslavia, recommended the establishment of Arab end Jewish regional zones which would be confederated in something like the Swiss cantonal pattern.

The Secretary General circulated the Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the member states.

The Political Committee of the Arab League met and decided that the Arab states should address communiqués to both the United Kingdom and the United States warning them against the implementation of the Majority report of the Committee of Inquiry and holding them responsible for the consequences in case the partition plan was implemented.

The notes addressed to the United Kingdom and the United States were very similar in their content. Because of their historical importance it may be useful to give a translation of the note addressed to the United Kingdom by Iraq.

22 September, 1947

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its greetings to His Britannic Majesty’s Embassy in Baghdad, and it has the honour of informing the Embassy of the unanimous Resolution of the Political Committee of the Council of the League of Arab States passed on the 19th of September, 1947, and wishes to call the attention of the honourable Embassy to the following points and requests it to convey them as quickly as possible to His Britannic Majesty’s Government.

1. When the British Government's Mandate over Palestine was decided, although it was basically invalid because of the people's opposition to it, it was intended, in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that it should prepare the original inhabitants of this land to be an independent nation, and to achieve their political maturity in the shortest possible time so that, when the basic requirements for independence were completed, the Mandate would be terminated and independence declared. On the 18th of April, 1946, the League of Nations was dissolved and the Mandate emanating from the League supposing it was valid, ceased. But the British Government wished to continue its supervision of this land in order to achieve the prosperity of its original inhabitants. It was a wish offered by the British side and opposed by the Arabs of Palestine and rejected by all means by which they had been accustomed to express themselves from the time the Mandate was established. In February, 1947, the Foreign Secretary of the British Government declared in the British Parliament that the people of Palestine had achieved a cultural and political maturity which qualified them to practise the independence of their land. Their case would be like that of other Arab lands which were severed from the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne and who now in fact enjoyed independence. In spite of this and in spite of successive promises made to the Arabs by the British Government. It has not followed the natural course by declaring the independence of Palestine.

2. Since the Committee of Inquiry formed by the United Nations has submitted proposals which, in total and in part, demolish the independence of Palestine as an Arab State, the Arabs of Palestine and all inhabitants of the Arab lands deplore these proposals and refuse them and their foundations and declare to His Britannic Majesty’s Government from now that there is no legal authority anywhere which has the right to cut a piece from Arab Palestine and offer it to the Zionists to erect a Jewish state thereon. They also declare that there is no legal authority which is capable of permitting the invasion of Palestine by Jews who have no relation with it and who are not entitled to enter it.

3. The invasion of Palestine by Zionist elements has been associated with acts of violence and terrorism in order to enable them to establish their feet in the land so as to be able later on to achieve their ambitions in neighbouring Arab states.

4. For this reason the Governments of the Arab states have already warned the afore-mentioned Committee of Inquiry of the consequences of recommending the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine end revealed to them that this would certainly lead to troubles which would engulf the whole Middle East, the reason being that the Arabs of Palestine will not yield to any measure which will do away with the unity end independence of their lend. They will surely wage a war which knows no relaxation in order to repel that aggression from their land, especially since they know that all Arab lands will stand behind them to support them and provide them with men, money and ammunition for self-defence. The Arab Governments themselves will not be able to suppress the rebellious feelings of their peoples aroused by the injustice imposed on them. Nor will the Arab Governments stand with folded hands vis-a-vis a danger which threatens all Arab lands. They will be obliged to undertake some decisive action in order to repel aggression and restore right to its position.

A stand of this kind on the part of the Arab peoples or their Governments is not an exceptional matter since it has been proved on various occasions that the Zionists depend for their armament, terrorist movement and war activities, by which they inflict harm on the Arabs of Palestine, on political and material help offered to them by some foreign governments and by some bodies and organizations which encourage those governments. Besides, the problem of disarming the Jews to stop their terrorist activities has been the subject of repeated requests and protests made by the Arab Governments to the British Government without those efforts leading to any decisive success.

5. For these reasons it is the view of the Iraqi Government, which is still tied to His Britannic Majesty’s Government with the strongest of ties, that it is her duty to make clear to them the danger which is actually engulfing security and peace in the Middle East and to charge them with the responsibility for all the events that may follow in case a resolution is taken which infringes the right of Palestine to become an independent Arab state.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to express its highest esteem and respects.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the British Embassy, Iraq

I am sure that the British and American governments did not give much weight to such memoranda presented by Arab governments who were not strong enough to defend Arab rights or threaten Western interests. But certainly both the United States and Britain underestimated the potential danger to peace and relations with the West which would be engendered by the frustration of the Arabs of Palestine and the Arabs in all other lends.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, 1947

Organization and meetings of the Arab delegations

Before going to the Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly I went to the Ministry of Defence in Baghdad and had a meeting with the Minister, Shakir al-Wadi. I put before him the possibility of the United Nations passing a resolution which might prejudice Arab rights in Palestine. That might lead to trouble and blood shed that would endanger Arab lives and security. I inquired about the policy of the Ministry vis-a-vis such a situation And whether the Iraqi Ministry of Defence could come to the help end defence of our Palestinian brethren, because that would have a great effect on the stand Iraq would take in the United Nations. He assured me that the Ministry of Defence would take all measures to defend the rights of our Palestinian brethren and that I could speak with full assurance that the Ministry of Defence supported my words.

The major work done by the Arabs together in a united way for the sake of Palestine was their struggle in the United Nations Session, in the autumn of 1947, to try to prevent the partition of Palestine.

The Arab delegations included some strong and experienced persons. From the Egyptian delegation I remember Mohammed Husain Heikal Pasha, Dr Mahmoud Fawzi and Memduh Riyadh. The Lebanese delegation included Camille Sham’un Dr Charles Malik and Dr Victor Khouri. The Syrian delegation included Faris al-Khouri, Ameer 'Adil Arsalan and Dr Farid Zainuddin. The Saudi Arabian delegation included H. R. H. Prince Faisal and Dr 'Awni Dajjani. The Iraqi delegation included Nuri as-Sa’id and Dr Mohammed Fadhel Jamal. The Palestine delegation was headed by Jamal al-Husaini. I wish to put on record here the name off Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, then the foreign Minister of Pakistan, who took an active and whole-hearted part in the defence of Palestine.

The Arab delegations met frequently to integrate their activities. They held some general meetings for all the members of the delegation. They also formed a higher political committee attended by the heads of delegations and one other member from each delegation. They formed a liaison committee to contact the various delegations and another to draft memoranda and statements for publicity and the press.

We all worked with zeal and passion to defend the cause of justice and humanity for the Arabs of Palestine. We worked day and night under constant strain. The pressure of power politics was great and we sometimes had to speak as fighters and not as diplomats.

The Opening the Session of the General Assembly

At the opening of each session of the General Assembly, heads of delegations make speeches setting out the general lines of their policy. General Marshall, Secretary of state for the United States, said that his government "gave much weigh" to the report of the majority of the Committee of Inquiry which recommended the partition of Palestine. Heads of several Arab delegations, including Iraq, expressed in their statements of policy their dismay at the attitude taken by the United States and advised the United States government not to be rash in taking a stand under the influence of Zionist propaganda and pressure. General Marshall met the heads of the Arab delegations at a luncheon party and assured them that America was still open minded and had reached no final decision yet, and that "giving weight" to the majority report did not mean final acceptance of it.

Next came the allocation of the items of the agenda of the Session to the various Committees. The Palestine problem, being major political question, should have been sent to the Political Committee for debate. Instead an Ad Hoc Political Committee was formed to deal with it. This was done over the objections of the Arab delegations who wanted the First Committee, namely, the Political Committee, to deal with Palestine, since the heads of delegations usually sat in the First Committee.

The Ad Hoc Political Committee

When the Ad Hoc Political Committee was formed, Dr Evatt, the Foreign Minister of Australia, was elected as its Chairman. The representative of Australia on the Committee of Inquiry had been quite neutral and he had not voted for partition. Thus the Arabs were deceived by thinking that Dr Evatt would be an impartial Chairman. Actually he proved to be a master of tactics in steering the Ad Hoc Political Committee toward achieving Zionist ends.

When the Ad Hoc Political Committee first met it decided that the representatives of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency should be invited to take part in the discussions and to answer questions. The Arab Higher Committee was led by Jamal al-Husaini. The representatives of the Jewish Agency were led by Moshe Shertok (Sharett).

When the general debate was opened, various delegations began to express their views on the report of the Committee of Inquiry. Some states criticized the majority report and some agreed with it. Others celled for conciliation and understanding between the Arabs and the Jews. Others dealt with the legal aspects of the subject. From the Iraqi delegation Nuri Sa'id end I made statements. The former dealt with the betrayal of the Arabs and the injustice of the Balfour declaration imposing Zionism on Palestine, and showed how all of that was contrary to the letters of Sir Henry McMahon to King Husain in the First World War and e violation of Arab natural rights. In my speech I dealt with the fundamental principles in the light of which the Palestinian problem should be examined. I showed that the recommendation of the majority of the Committee of Inquiry as well as the Zionist claims were all contrary to democratic principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter. I refuted the claim of Jewish right to a national home as well as their need for such a home. The Jews, citizen in any country, must consider that country as their home. I criticized the United States which contradicted itself when it called for the application of some principles in Greece and denied the application of the same principles to the Arabs of Palestine.

One of the most important speeches defending the Arab cause was made by Sir Muhammad Mafrullah Khan, leader of the Pakistan delegation. He reviewed the Palestine question and proved the legality of Arab rights therein, refuted all Zionist claims of the partition, proposal. His speech made a deep impression on the Committee.

Many people were waiting to hear what the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union had to say. Mr Creech-Jones, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, made an important statement. He spoke in the name of the British government explaining that the Mandate is unworkable and stating that his government would not undertake any solution which did not please both Arabs and Jews. The statement made some members doubt the possibility of imposing partition so long as the Arabs opposed it and so long as Britain was not willing to use force to implement it.

A speech by Jamal al-Husaini followed in which he explained that the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to their own country, Palestine, was a natural, unquestionable right and that they would not yield a span of Palestine before shedding the last drop of their blood and that the Palestine Arab delegation was not ready to take part in any discussion regarding the partition plan for it was absolutely rejected from its very foundations.

He was followed by Rabbi Silver on behalf of the Jewish Agency who claimed that the Jews had historical connections with Palestinian support by the Balfour declaration and that the Mandate gave them rights in all of Palestine. But they were ready now to sacrifice and let TransJordan be excluded and they also would accept the part left to them. In other words, he accepted the partition scheme.

Everybody was anxious to hear the statement of the delegate of the United States. Mr Hershel Johnson made the statement which endorsed the partition scheme and called for an international militia of volunteers to implement it. He stated that he took it for granted that United Nations member states surrounding Palestine would not undertake any aggressive (sic) move. This was a reference to the Arab states.

The American statement came as a great disappointment to the hopes of the Arab delegations who had seen the statement 24 hours before it was delivered and who had asked Faris al-Khouri to make a reply immediately after its delivery. He did make a very forceful reply. He was followed by a number of speakers, some of them from the Arab delegations.

Later I prepared a speech refuting the statements of all those who supported the partition scheme like Uruguay, Poland and Guatemala. I then turned to the United States and explained American relation to the Zionist and how Zionist propaganda in the United States and the Zionist role in American electioneering and elections had led to this harmful plan for partition, harmful to American interest, the interests of the United Nations itself and the interests of world peace. Then I dealt with the Committee of Inquiry and exposed the partisanship to Zionism of some of its members. Next I refuted the proposed plan for partition in the light of the principles of justice, politics, economics, peace and stability, and emphasized that partition was not practical and could not succeed.

Of those who spoke in the Ad Hoc Committee 16 states were in favour of the partition and 12 including the Arab states were against partition. The Iraqi delegation, supported by the Syrian delegation, questioned the legality of the United Nations passing a resolution of partition against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of a country. The Charter does not authorize the United Nations to take such measures. If the UN should pass such a resolution they would be acting illegally and openly violating the Charter. I suggested, then, that the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague for consultation to avoid the passing of a mistaken resolution.

The proposal was a reasonable one, and we had enough votes to carry it in the morning when it should have come to the vote in the Ad Hoc Political Committee. However, voting was postponed until the evening session. A dinner party had been arranged by the opposition to which some of those who supported the Resolution were invited so that they would be absent at the time of voting. The Resolution came to the vote in the evening and the number of votes for and against were equal. The deciding vote against going to the International Court was cast by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. Some years later I came across a book called, The Law of the United Nations, by a well-known professor of International Law, Dr Hans Kelsen, who himself is a Jew. He comments in one of the footnotes of his book that the objection raised by the delegate of Iraq, as well as by others, to the legality of the partition Resolution was valid. (Footnote: Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1951, p. 197 )

The United Nations, from a strictly legal point of view, was not entitled to take a decision to partition a country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. Dr Hans Kelsen is an important witness and he comes from the Jewish side. When the general debate was over, three sub-committees were formed. The first was to study the project of partition and to put it in its final shape. The second was to study the project of the unitary state and to prepare a final draft proposal. The third was to study the question of conciliation and of reconciling the Arab and Zionist views. The formation of these committees was entrusted to the Chairman. He formed the first and the second sub-committees from delegations who favoured the purpose of the committee. The sub-committee on partition was made up of USA, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Guatemala, Uruguay, the Union of South Africa end Venezuela. The sub-committee on the unitary state was made up of the six Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen), Afganistan, Pakistan and Columbia. As for the sub-committee for conciliation, it was made up of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, Prince Wan of Thailand and the rapporteur from Iceland. Britain was requested to send representatives to both the first and second sub-committees. The Jewish Agency was to send a representative to the first sub-committee and the Higher Arab Committee to send a representative to the Second sub-committee. In the second sub-committee I nominated the representative of Columbia to become Chairman and the representative of Pakistan to become rapporteur. The representative of Columbia asked Mr Evatt to include some impartial members in the committees. When he declined to do so the representative of Columbia withdrew from the sub-committee. The representative of Pakistan acted as both Chairman and rapporteur of the sub-committee.

The sub-committee on the unitary state made the following proposal:

We hereby submit the following proposal as being the only just, practical and democratic way to achieve the independence of Palestine and its future constitutional organization:

1. That an Arab state in the whole of Palestine be established on democratic lines.

2. That the said Arab state of Palestine will respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law.

3. That the said Arab State of Palestine will protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities.

4. That freedom of worship and Access to the Holy Place will be guaranteed to all

The following steps will have to be taken to give effect to the aforesaid principles:

(a) A Constituent Assembly shall be elected at the earliest possible time. All genuine and law-abiding nationals of Palestine will be entitled to participate in the elections for the Constituent Assembly.

(b) The said Constituent Assembly shall, within a fixed time, formulate and enact a Constitution for the Arab State of Palestine, which shall be of a democratic nature and shall embody the above-mentioned four principles.

(c) A government shall be formed within a fixed time, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution to take over the administration of Palestine from the Mandatory Power.

The third sub-committee did nothing but send a letter to Prince Faisal, the representative of Saudi Arabia, and to General Marsahll, Secretary of State of the United States, asking them to meet and reach a settlement. Prince Faisal expressed his willingness to meet with General Marshall, but the letter did not respond to the sub-committee's request. The first sub-committee took some time to do the work entrusted to it. It met some legal and practical difficulties which it could not overcome, especially in the question of implementing partition, for Britain would accept no responsibility in this connection. The Zionists took part in the sub-committee with vehement zeal, and Moshe Shertok sat with the butchers who were cutting up Palestine bit by bit. He chose and asked for the pieces of meat which suited Israeli interests. While this dissection was going on, a conflict started between Shertok and the United States delegate Ambassador Hershel Johnson, about the allotment of the Negev. The Special Committee of Inquiry had recommended the Negev, at least most of it, should be included in the Arab state of Palestine. As for Shertok, he insisted that it should go to the Zionists. After some give And take in the sub-committee, Johnson was celled to the telephone. Truman in person was on the line ordering him to give Negev to the Zionists, contrary to the recommendations of the Special Committee of Inquiry. Johnson returned from the telephone to the sub-committee, changed his stand, and yielded to the wishes of Shertok. Thus the sub-committee, and later the General Assembly, gave the Zionists more than had been proposed by the special committee which had recommended partition. It gave them practically all that Shertok asked for, and that was due to the intervention of Truman who had succumbed to Dr Weizmann's influence.

After a week or so the Ad Hoc Committee met to consider the reports of the three sub-committees. They started with the report of t he sub-committee on partition. Questions were addressed by the representatives of Pakistan and Syria regarding the legal foundations of the Palestine question and the partition project. The delegate of Lebanon asked some embarrassing questions which showed the impossibility of partition from the practical point of view and the absurdity of partition. As for me, I asked about the stand of the United Nations vis-a-vis a people who will defend themselves if their country is invaded. would the United Nations declare war on e people who would surely defend them selves driven by the instinct of survival. Then several delegates spoke, some approving the project of partition and others objecting. I spoke for the second time calling attention to the fact that the partition project contradicted the United Nations Charter in letter and spirit. I warned of the dangers which would ensure from imposing partition and stated that the Arab countries would all be disturbed and resort to force. I addressed the American delegate very sharply requesting him to follow the path of peace and justice and not the path of force and imposition by influencing the neutral states. I asked him if the United States was reedy to send force to fight the Arabs, and, if that were the case, would she provide the opportunity for others states also to send force? If both the United States and the Soviet Union send force to Palestine, what would the effect be on the international situation?

The next day Nuri as-Sa'id delivered a speech regarding the Communist danger facing the Arab lands from the ports of the Black Sea and how there are persons, who are not Jews, who infiltrate with the Jewish immigrants for political aims which will cause trouble throughout the Middle East. I intended to speak for the third time but Chairman Evatt would not permit it, so I passed my word to my Egyptian colleague who read it after his own speech without reference to Iraq. Some amendments were proposed to the partition project to avoid British objections regarding implementation and regarding reference to the Security Council for the General Assembly had no competence in this matter. The vote on the project for partition was taken in an evening session. There were 25 votes in favour, 13 against and 17 abstention. The project for a unitary state was automatically rejected since the plan for partition had received a majority vote.

The General Assembly Vote on Partition

Next came the struggle to prevent the passing of a Resolution to partition Palestine. To be accepted, the resolution would require a vote in favour by two-third of the voting. It is customary in the United Nations at times to do some 'horse trading’ between member states. When you request a delegation's support in a question which concerns, you, that delegation will expect your support in a question that concerns it. The Arab delegations had six votes in the United Nations at that time, for Yemen had joined the UN in that session. We were ready to exchange votes with whoever supported us in defeating partition. When the Greek government brought a complaint to the United Nations against Soviet intervention in northern Greece where the Greek rebels were getting soviet support in their activities, the complaint was discussed in the General Assembly. When the question came to a vote, most of the Arab states abstained. Iraq was the only Arab state that voted on the side of Greece. Iraq had, as a principle, always stood against Communist intervention and against subversive movements anywhere in the world.

When the time came for voting on the partition of Palestine, Mr Dandramis, Head of the Greek delegation was including to abstain from voting thus returning tit-for-tat to the Arab states who had abstained on the Greek question. I sought the help of the head of the Turkish delegation Saleem Sarper, And we went together to meet Mr Dandramis and to ask that he should reciprocate in the matter of the Iraqi vote for Greece with a vote against the partition of Palestine. We said that it would not be appropriate for him to refrain from giving Iraq a supporting vote. On the contrary, it would be most appropriate for him to vote against the partition of Palestine. Ever since, so far as I know, Greece has supported the Arab stand on the Palestine question.

At a meeting of the Heads of Arab delegations Faris al-Khouri and Farid Zainuddin, who were in contact with the Soviet bloc, suggested that we should come to un understanding with the Soviets that we would vote with them on their problems if they would help us by voting against partition. In the name of the Iraqi delegation I said that we were ready to do that. We were ready to cooperate with the Soviets in the United Nations if they would guarantee their stand on our side and their votes against the partition of Palestine. But we would not support them without previous assurance that they would stand with us. The meeting authorized Faris al-Khouri to contact the Soviet bloc on this basis. Not many days passed before Andrei Gromyko, delegate of the Soviet Union, went to the rostrum of the General Assembly to announce the sympathy of the Soviet Union for the Jews who had been persecuted by Hitler and to say that they deserved to be helped to establish a state of their own in Palestine. He said that the Soviets would support the partition of Palestine.

The Arab delegation continued to exert great efforts to win support for Arab rights in Palestine and their efforts were about to yield fruit, for there were enough votes to ensure that the General Assembly would reject the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine. Had the General Assembly voted before the American Thanksgiving Day recess there would not have been a two-thirds majority in favour of the Resolution. But, due the influence of the American delegation and the machinations of the United Nation Secretariat led by Trygvie Lie, a postponement of the voting was arranged. The argument against taking the vote was that there were still several speakers on the list and that it would not be possible to take the vote on the day before Thanksgiving Zafrullah Khan and I went to the President of the General Assembly, Dr Arania, and asked to withdraw our names from the list of speakers and we assured him that other delegates including those of the Arab delegations were willing to withdrew their names from the list of speakers. Dr Arania did not grant our request for he was under political pressure.

In the Session a motion was made to adjourn until after the American Thanksgiving Day. This was passed by a simple majority vote. During the recess came President Truman’s intervention and his pressure on some states needing American aid. The Zionists redoubled their efforts in the capitals of the world. As a result, several European and South American delegations changed their stand from anti-partition or abstention to the stand for partition. Thus, when the Session was resumed we found ourselves facing defeat. As a last resort I went to the rostrum and delivered a speech asking for time for further negotiation and efforts to reach en agreed solution of the Palestine problem and to avoid a greet catastrophe. Many eloquent speeches were made, notably by Sir Zafrullah Khan and Dr Lopez, the Head of the Columbian delegation, in which they challenged the legality of partition and its violation of the principles of the Charter. They emphasized the danger to peace and stability in the Middle East. The Columbian, refuting the arguments in favour of the partition policy, revealed the greet pressure being brought on him to vote for partition. He warned the UN against taking precipitous action which would endanger world peace. He stated that the question of Palestine could be deferred for another two months for further study and negotiations. The delegate of France stated that he saw a ray of hope in the speech of the-Iraqi delegate and he proposed a postponement of the debate for 24 hours so as to permit the two parties to reach an understanding. The motion was carried.

The Arab delegations welcomed the postponement. The Americans and the Soviets, on the other hand, opposed it, for it was hoped that voting on the partition would be concluded without delay. The Zionists had prepared in advance their jubilant celebrations. The success of the French proposal was a disappointment for them. The Arab delegations met and their meeting continued until late at night. It was thought that it was in the interests of the Arabs that they should make a last attempt and a show of good will in an effort to come to an understanding with the Zionists. The Arab delegations decided to submit a federal plan for Palestine, a plan in the formulation of which Jamal al-Husaini, representative of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, would not take part and for which he would accept no responsibility. Faris al-Khouri of Syria and Camille Sham'un of Lebanon were asked to prepare the draft resolution and to contact Mr Lopez, the leader of the Columbian delegation, on the method of its presentation.

The draft resolution was submitted by Camille Sham’un in the afternoon session. The American, Russian and Canadian delegations opposed it vigorously and refused to discuss it. Each of them emphasized that there was no solution except partition and that any attempt at conciliation was designed for procrastination and to gain time. The delegate of Columbia was ready to propose adjournment in order to give time to study the federal plan, but the American delegate requested him not to do so. On learning of this, I asked the Head of the Iranian delegation, Mr 'Adl, to ask for the adjournment, which he did. He submitted a proposal asking for adjournment long enough to study the Arab draft resolution. President Arania refused to submit the proposal for discussion or a vote. Faris al-Khouri went to the rostrum end criticized the manner in which the question was being treated and the spirit prevailing in pushing the partition plan through the United Nations. He said that the United Nations had not exerted any effort to bring about an agreed settlement.

President Arania went ahead and put the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine to the vote. The result was 13 states against, 33 for, and 10 abstentions.

Voting against partition were: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Those voting for partition were: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bylo-Russia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrania, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Those that abstained were: Argentine, Chili, Chine, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

The delegate of Thailand absented himself.

After the result of the vote had been announced, Prince Faisal for Saudi Arabia, Zafrullah Khan for Pakistan, I myself for Iraq and Emir ‘Adil Arsalan for Syria, each went to the rostrum to deprecate the Resolution on Partition and to express bitter disappointment in the United Nations and to announce that the Arab states would not be bound by the Resolution which was unjust and unfair to Arab rights and contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. Then all the Arab delegations quit the Assembly in protest. Their departure created a sad and solemn atmosphere. Next the Arab delegations met and prepared a strong statement which was delivered to the press. The Arab delegations had tried actively to convince other delegations to vote against partition by appealing to logic, justice and law. Their efforts were successful with delegations who had a living conscience end an independent judgment. But some delegations were compelled to change their stand when they saw power end the material interests of their countries on the other side. We remember how the delegate of Haiti shed tears when he was forced to change his country's vote to one in favour of partition. We recall how General Romulo of the Philippines left the U.S.A, because of Zionist threats. Dr Arce of the Argentine, who had stood against partition, came to me and said that he was sorry that he had to abstain rather than to vote against partition, but this was the result of pressure on his government. These are a few of the several delegates who were forced to vote against their convictions.

Sometime before the vote was taken I was talking with Lester Pearson, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and later Prime Minister. I said, "Mr Pearson, do you believe that the act of partitioning Palestine against the will of its inhabitants is an act dictated by conscience and law?" He answered me frankly, "Dr Jamali, politics doesn't know conscience or law unless they are supported by power. As for us today, we are obliged to comply with the policy of the U.S.A. in what she decides on Palestine." Thus Lester Pearson remained a strong supporter of Zionism, not because of conscientious conviction or for legal reasons, but because power and political interests required it of him. The same held true for the representative of Czechoslovakia who also said that the legal aspect of the Palestine problem had been ignored and that the politics of the Great Powers decided the issue and that the U.S.A. had the last word in the matter of Palestine.

The Arabs owe a debt of gratitude to Ambassador Belt of Cuba who courageously and forcefully fought the resolution on the partition of Palestine on the basis of its being unjust, illegal and not conducive to peace in the Middle East. When, at the last minute, his government decided to change its position and vote partition he resigned his post rather then to follow his government's instructions and vote against his own conscience.

Arab Confrontation with Zionists at the United Nations

The Arab delegates had to enter into lengthy debates with other United Nations delegates privately or in the United Nations to refute Zionist claims. This is the Arab point of view:

The Arabs are not anti-Jewish, for the Jews have lived with them for centuries in peace and harmony. There is much in common between them racially, religiously and culturally. It is the invading, aggressive Zionism that they oppose and object to, for it is poisoning the atmosphere in the Middle East. Zionism is a reactionary, nationalistic movement. It is based on racial and religious discrimination and segregation by the Jews. In reality it represents neither race nor religion. The Jews of the world do not represent one race. They have mixed with several other human races" and they have assimilated non-Semitic peoples who were converted to Judaism. As for religion, not all Zionists practice Judaism. There are those who are laic, and there are those who are anti-religious atheists. There are also those Jews, a respectable group, who refuse to march under the Zionist banner. The non-Zionist or anti-Zionist Jews hold to their religion as a religion and do not mix it with nationalism. So Zionist nationalism based on race and religion is a myth. Furthermore, it is a reactionary myth because it tries to undermine Jewish loyalty in any country where it penetrates. It tries to inculcate amongst the Jews a new loyalty which alienates them from the mother country in which they live. It disunites humanity instead of uniting it. In this sense it is a reactionary movement.

As for Zionism being an aggressive movement, this hardly needs an explanation, for the Zionists invaded a country inhabited by its people and evacuated those people by force and, took their place. That is aggression in its worst form. The Zionists came to the United Nations using the following arguments:

Palestine has been the national home of the Jews for thousands of years, and the Jews dispersed allover the world, have never cut their spiritual relations with Palestine at any time.

The Arabs possess vast lands. Why should they not give up a small portion of their lands to the Zionists?

The Zionists developed Palestine and brought modern civilization to the Middle East.

Hitler persecuted the Jews and exterminated millions of them. After this persecution the Jews deserve to have a home of their own to which they can go.

The Arab delegations would answer as follows:

The whole of Palestine has never been the home of the Jews at any time in history. The Jews did rule over parts of Palestine for a period of about 400 years, but that was over 2000 years ago. As for the existence of a Jewish minority in Palestine throughout this period, this does not give the Jews who are outside Palestine any right to the country. What is to apply to Palestine should be a general rule made to apply to all human beings. If the people of the world today are to return to the homes of their forefathers of thousands of years ago, the whole map of the world would have to be revised today.

As for the argument that the Arabs possess vast lands, so does the U.S.A., so does Canada and China and Australia and Brazil, etc. Does the vastness of a country give others the right to come and occupy it? Here again there must be a general rule which is applicable to all the world. Nothing should be applied to Palestine which is not applicable to other lands as well.

As for the argument that the Zionists developed Palestine and introduced modern scientific methods in agriculture, health, etc., this is exactly the logic of the old European imperialism, and imperialism is what definitely characterizes Zionism in addition to reaction and aggression. What the Zionists did in Palestine in the way of development is no different from what the white colonialists did in Asia and Africa. It does not give them the right of domination. In their new renaissance the Arabs do not need Zionism, for the main sources of modern civilization are available to all mankind.

As for the cruelties of Hitler, they were directed toward all the enemies of Naziism, Jews and non-Jews alike. Granting, however, that Hit